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ONVERTIBLE debt plays a significant funding role in U.S. capi-
~tal markets. Several hundred companies have convertible debt is-
sues outstanding in quantities large enough to be traded by retail
investors and followed by commercial investor information services.' A
study of convertible debt covering the years 1963 to 1984 found that for a
selection of companies, convertible debt plays an especially important
* Professor of Law and Helen L. Crocker Faculty Scholar, Stanford University. I
would like to thank Christopher Hanna, Clarissa Potter, Roberta Romano, Reed
Shuldiner, and Eric Talley as well as workshop participants at the Harvard Law School
Seminar on Current Issues in Taxation, Stanford Law School, and the University of South-
ern California Law School for useful comments. All errors are my own responsibility.
1. The Value Line Convertibles Survey, at http://www.valueline.com/news/
conv011004.html, for example, comes out weekly and covers about 600 issues.
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role.2 In particular, during that time period more than 10% of all publicly
traded companies had one-third or more of their outstanding debt in con-
vertible form.3 In addition, convertible issuers tend to have special char-
acteristics including a high ratio of R&D to sales, a low ratio of tangible
assets to total assets, a high ratio of market to book value, a high ratio of
long-term debt to equity, and more volatile operating cash flows. 4
During the past decade, there have been public policy proposals con-
cerning certain aspects of the tax treatment of convertible debt. One of
these proposals came from the government itself. As part of a set of De-
cember 1995 tax proposals and in each of the tax proposal sections of the
budgets for fiscal years 1997 through 2000, the Clinton Administration
included a provision deferring the original issue discount ("OID") deduc-
tion on convertible debt. 5 Under this provision, the issuer would not be
able to deduct accrued OlD until this OID was actually paid. In the case
of a zero coupon bond, this rule would defer the deduction until the is-
suer pays off the bond at maturity. If the holder exercises the option to
convert the bond into equity in the meantime, the OID deduction would
be lost entirely. Furthermore, the provision does not exempt the holder
from paying taxes on accruing, but unpaid, OlD. The holder who con-
verts would have a higher basis as a result, but at the cost of paying taxes
on the increase at ordinary income rates.
There is tax reasoning that supports this approach. A convertible bond
is an instrument that has traits in common with both debt and equity. On
one hand, convertible bonds have an underlying "straight debt" contract
that is similar to a traditional bond. This contract may involve periodic
interest payments or may be in zero coupon form where there is an obli-
gation to pay a certain amount at some fixed time in the future. On the
other hand, convertible bonds also give the holder an option to exchange
2. See Stuart Essig, Convertible Securities and Capital Structure Determinants (1991)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago) (on
file with author).
3. The actual sample was all COMPUSTAT companies, a collection that includes all
companies traded on major U.S. exchanges.
4. See Jeremy C. Stein, Convertible Bonds as Backdoor Equity Financing, 32 J. FIN.
ECON. 3, 13-14 (1992) (summarizing results, primarily from Essig, supra note 2).
5. See RIA, President Presents Latest Tax Proposals, FED. TAXES WKLY. ALERT
NEWSL. (Dec. 14, 1995), available at http://www.riahome.com; Office of Management and
Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1997, Analytical Perspec-
tives, at 38-39 [hereinafter President's Fiscal 1997 Budget]; Office of Management and
Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1998, Analytical Perspec-
tives, at 48 [hereinafter President's Fiscal 1998 Budget]; Office of Management and
Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1999, Analytical Perspec-
tives, at 65 [hereinafter President's Fiscal 1999 Budget]; Office of Management and
Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2000, Analytical Perspec-
tives, at 81 [hereinafter President's Fiscal 2000 Budget]; James S. Eustice, 'Debt-Like' Eq-
uity & 'Equity-Like' Debt: Treasury's Anti-Hybrid Proposals, 71 TAX NOTES 1657, 1658,
1660-61 (1996) (describing the December 1995 Treasury proposals). The original version
of this article, containing much the same analysis as appears in this published version, was
written and circulated among legal academics in the summer of 1997, a few months after
the promulgation of the Fiscal Year 1998 Budget.
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each bond for a given number of common shares of the issuer.6 If the
company does well or shows increased future potential so that the com-
mon shares appreciate significantly, the shares underlying the bonds will
be more valuable than the principal paid at maturity and the holder will
want to convert the bonds before they mature. Thus, the conversion right
is similar to a call option on the company's returns, and this type of op-
tion is an integral part of equity ownership.7 Furthermore, after conver-
sion, the debt contract part of the convertible bond is extinguished, and
the holder is a pure equity owner.
Since tax law treats debt and equity quite differently, instruments that
have characteristics of both debt and equity are particularly troublesome
for the tax system.8 Most convertible bonds do end up being converted
6. Some bonds are convertible into shares of companies other than the issuer or con-
vertible into some security other than common stock. But this type of conversion feature is
unusual.
7. Equity owners hold the residual claim to corporate earnings after subtracting
amounts owed to various creditors. As a result, equity owners have the right to returns
above a certain amount, a right that is effectively a call option on the returns.
There is one important trait of equity ownership not shared by convertible bonds prior
to conversion. Equity owners effectively have sold a put to the debtholders of the corpora-
tion because these debtholders have the right to receive a fixed amount at the time the
debt matures. Holders of convertible debt have this put option but give it up upon conver-
sion. Holding a convertible bond is therefore similar to holding the stock of a company
plus a (European) put exercisable at maturity for the principal amount due at that time.
The convertible bondholder can convert right before maturity if the put option is worthless
because the value of the underlying shares exceeds the amount due at maturity or can
"exercise" the put option by not converting the bond and thus demanding repayment of
the stated principal amount.
For readers familiar with the put-call parity equation, it is possible to visualize this rela-
tionship more precisely. Suppose S is the value of the stock, P is the value of a put at an
exercise price, E, and C is the value of a call with the same exercise price and exercise date.
The put-call parity equation is:
S + P = C + PV(E)
where PV(E) is the present value of the exercise price, the value of holding a zero coupon
bond that pays E at the time of exercise. A convertible bond is analogous to either side of
the equation above. Such a bond is like holding a pure zero coupon bond that will pay E at
a fixed date in the future with value given by PV(E) plus a call option with value C that
will pay off if the stock increases above E. A convertible bond is also like holding the
underlying stock, but with the right to put the stock for the amount E when the bond
matures.
As discussed later, this relationship is a precise equivalence if, and only if, the holder has
no incentive to convert the bond prior to maturity. See infra text accompanying note 17.
Otherwise, it is only an analogy or approximation.
8. See 3 BoRis I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS $ 91.10.1-10.4 (2d ed. 1991). The problems arise for two reasons.
First, "debt" and "equity" are not precise categories, making distinguishing them difficult.
Second, at the debt/equity borderline there is a sharp discontinuity in the tax rules: The tax
treatment of debt and equity are very different. See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial
Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569, 591, 598-600 (1994). Adminis-
trative and legislative attention has focused on the danger that issuers will attempt to dis-
guise equity as debt in order to achieve desirable tax outcomes such as the ability to deduct
interest payments versus not being able to deduct dividend payments. In contrast, it is not
hard to incorporate debt into an equity type of instrument. Many corporations have some
minimal level of returns that is highly predictable. These returns can support the issuance
of highly rated bonds. But the corporation can fund itself entirely through equity and thus
achieve an equity-like tax treatment for all of its returns even though a substantial portion
2003]
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rather than extinguished by a repayment of principal when the bond ma-
tures.9 In fact, one view of convertible bonds is that they are a "back-
door" source of equity financing' ° or a method of issuing equity with a
delay. I An immediate issuance of equity may be more costly than issu-
ing debt, but the company ultimately may not want to add debt to its
capital structure. If the company anticipates that its stock price will in-
crease, a convertible bond issuance will end up being converted into stock
and the company effectively will have issued equity on a delayed basis. If
the company issues convertible bonds at a discount as a form of delayed
equity and deducts the OlD, the company is securing the advantages of
debt-like treatment for an instrument that ultimately is intended to func-
tion as equity. Furthermore, assuming that the company's expectation of
future stock price increases is correct, the holders of the bonds will con-
vert the bonds to stock with certainty and the company never will make
any payments that correspond to the OID deductions. The Clinton Ad-
ministration's proposal would have ended this pleasant state of affairs by
denying any OID deductions until they are actually paid.
One can attack this reasoning on its own terms' 2 and the Clinton Ad-
ministration's proposal may have had other, more salient motivations.1 3
Furthermore, because convertible debt shares traits of both debt and eq-
of those returns may be debt-like. See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products in a
Second-Best World: Bifurcation and Integration, 50 TAX L. REv. 545, 568-69 (1995).
9. See Alexander J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Conversion Rights and the Design
of Financial Contracts, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1231, 1237 n.12 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 4, at 3-4.
11. In surveys of firms, around 70% of respondents mention the desire to issue
delayed equity as the main reason for using convertible bonds to raise funds. See Triantis
& Triantis, supra note 9, at 1237 n.12.
12. Although conversion of the bonds allows the company to receive OtD deductions
without ever making any payments, the holders of the bonds have paid taxes on the OlD
without ever receiving any payments. If the holders and issuers are subject to the same
marginal tax rate, this arrangement would not lose any revenue, so that there is no harm to
the Treasury. In addition, given that rate situation, one would expect the issuance price of
convertible bonds to reflect the future expected transfer of tax liability from the corpora-
tion to the buyers of the bonds so that there is no effect on funding incentives.
Even if some holders are subject to lower marginal rates than the corporation, the price
effect may fully offset any corporate benefit if the marginal investor is subject to the same
marginal rate as the corporation. Since security prices must make the marginal investor
indifferent between alternative investments, the price of convertible bonds would have to
fall enough to compensate for the tax disadvantages to the marginal investor. If that inves-
tor faces corporate marginal rates, this price offset will exactly cancel the tax advantages
secured by the corporation.
13. The description of the proposal in two of the budget documents stresses the dispar-
ity in treatment between accrued, but unpaid, interest for bonds issued at par with the
treatment of OID bonds. See President's Fiscal 1997 Budget, supra note 5, at 38-39; Presi-
dent's Fiscal 1998 Budget, supra note 5, at 48. Many corporate bonds pay interest every six
months, and so-called "Eurobonds," which are quite common, pay interest annually.
When a holder converts a bond, the holder typically gives up any right to accrued, but
unpaid, interest. Convertible bonds typically are callable by the issuer after some fixed
period of time. Companies often call bonds to force conversion when the conversion value
of the bonds, the value of the stock into which the bond is convertible, exceeds the call
price. A common strategy, particularly among Eurobond issuers, is to call the bonds
before an interest payment is due to avoid paying the interest. In this case, the issuer does
not receive a deduction for the accrued interest because it was never paid. In contrast,
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uity, the question of how to tax convertible debt is bound to be difficult
and many of the best answers are likely to be unsatisfying.1 4 Nonetheless,
convertible debt appears to be a significant financing vehicle. This debt
may serve important nontax, efficiency-enhancing purposes. A very im-
portant question is how proposals such as the Clinton Administration's
proposal would interact with the ability of convertible bonds to achieve
such purposes. This article examines that question.
Part I considers the question of why companies use convertible bonds
as a funding vehicle. There is considerable theoretical and empirical liter-
ature concerning convertible debt. Any theory as to purposes must ex-
plain both the peculiarities of convertible bond contracts and a wide
variety of established empirical regularities. The theory that has the most
explanatory power is that issuing convertible bonds instead of straight
debt or equity signals the issuer's prospects. Part II discusses the tax
treatment of convertible bonds. Part III details how various tax treat-
ments affect the signaling functions of convertible debt. Part IV states
conclusions and discusses policy implications.
I. THE FUNCTION OF CONVERTIBLE DEBT
A. A PUZZLE
Convertible bonds contain a number of peculiar, yet standard terms,
and there is also substantial empirical evidence concerning the impact
that issuing convertible bonds has on the value of the common stock of
the issuer. For a theory to explain the existence and use of convertible
debt, it must account for the standard terms as well as the observed em-
pirical regularities. Prior to examining such theories, it is worthwhile con-
sidering a very elementary puzzle that both legal and finance scholars
have posed:1 5 Since convertible bonds are simply a "package" of other
familiar securities, why would investors or the issuer see any advantage in
buying the package rather than the components? This question rests on
the fact that convertible bonds are, at least approximately, a "straight"
bond with no conversion privilege, plus a warrant.16
It is worth fleshing out this approximate equivalence. The standard
convertible bond contract allows the holder to exchange the bond for a
particular number of shares at any time prior to the time when the bond
matures. Certain features or circumstances may motivate the holder to
convert prior to maturity. Consider, first, the case where there is no rea-
son for early conversion. In that case, a convertible bond is exactly
under current law, issuers of OID bonds may deduct the accrued OID even if it is never
paid.
14. See supra note 8.
15. See, e.g., William A. Klein, The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 547, 555-61 (1975); Michael J. Brennan & Eduardo S. Schwartz, The Case for
Convertibles, 1 CHASE FIN. Q. 27, 28-32 (1982).
16. A warrant is a call option on a company's stock that is issued directly by the com-
pany to the public.
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equivalent to a straight bond with the same principal payment and cou-
pon terms plus a warrant exercisable at the time of maturity with a strike
price equal to the amount of principal due on the bond at that time.17
This equivalence is easy to understand. If conversion prior to maturity is
not optimal, the convertible bondholder will hold the bond until maturity
and then decide whether to forgo the final principal payment in exchange
for receiving the common stock due upon conversion of the bond. Prior
to maturity, the holder enjoys all of the straight bond features inherent in
the convertible bond. At maturity, the warrant feature comes into play.
The equivalence becomes approximate when there is a possibility that
holders will exercise the bond or the warrant prior to maturity. In this
case, the bond plus warrant package and the convertible bond differ be-
cause the holder of the package will retain the bond upon early exercise
of the warrant, while exercising the convertible bond means surrendering
the straight bond returns inherent in the convertible bond. The holder
might exercise early for several reasons, three of which are of interest
here.
Two of the reasons involve voluntary conversion by the holder of the
convertible bond or voluntary exercise by the holder of the warrant.
First, the underlying common stock may pay dividends. As is well known,
when a stock does not pay dividends, it is not optimal to exercise a call
option prior to expiration of the option. 18 The same principle applies to a
call option in the form of a warrant and the call option embedded in a
convertible bond. Holders of warrants and convertible bonds do not re-
ceive the dividends due on the underlying common stock. If the stock
does pay dividends, holders of warrants or convertible bonds may want to
exercise or convert prior to expiration of the warrant or conversion right
in order to receive the dividends.' 9 A second motivation for voluntary
conversion of a convertible bond or voluntary exercise of a warrant oc-
curs if the conversion ratio or exercise price changes over time. In partic-
ular, if the number of shares underlying the warrant or convertible bond
falls over time, while the total exercise price remains constant, it may be
optimal to convert early since doing so results in receiving a bigger equity
position.
17. See Jonathan E. Ingersoll, A Contingent-Claims Valuation of Convertible Securi-
ties, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 289, 310 (1977) (Theorem 5). In addition to stating and proving the
exact equivalence result, Professor Ingersoll also discusses in a rigorous way other aspects
of the approximate equivalence between convertible bonds and a straight bond plus a
warrant.
18. See JONATHAN S. INGERSOLL, THEORY OF FINANCIAL DECISIONMAKING 305
(1987) (Proposition 16); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J.
ECON. & McM'r. 141 (1973).
19. It is easy to see why early conversion may be optimal by considering the case
where the company declares that it will liquidate and pay out its entire value (net of
amounts required to retire all outstanding debt) as a dividend to shareholders. In the case
of the convertible bond, the dividend payment to be received upon conversion may exceed
the amount that would be received to retire the bond. In the case of the warrant, the only
hope for receiving any payoff is to convert immediately if the dividend payment on the
underlying shares exceeds the conversion price.
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The third reason for early conversion applies only to convertible bonds
and involves a very important feature: Convertible bonds almost always
are callable at the option of the issuer. The call price is specified in the
contract and there usually is a period of call protection following issuance
during which the issuer cannot call the bond.20 Under most bond con-
tracts, the issuer must announce a call thirty days in advance. The holder
of a convertible bond may convert it into common stock at any time and a
call announcement does not suspend the right to convert. As a result,
after the announcement of a call, the holder must decide whether to
tender the bond in exchange for the call price or to convert the bond into
common stock. The decision hinges on whether the conversion value of
the bond exceeds the call price. The conversion value of a bond at any
given moment is the value of the underlying stock at that moment. Ignor-
ing transaction costs, the holder would realize the conversion value by
converting the bond and selling the shares received. 21 The call price is
the price that the issuer must offer to pay for the bond after calling it.
This price usually is specified in the bond contract. If the conversion
value exceeds the call price, the holder is better off converting the bond
rather than tendering it to receive the call price. Thus, early conversion
may be "involuntary" in the sense that the holder converts in order to
retain the excess of conversion value over the call price. The fact that the
issuer can force conversion of a callable convertible issue when stock
prices are sufficiently high plays a particularly important role in the theo-
ries explaining the issuance of convertible bonds. The next Part discusses
this feature extensively.
It is now easy to see why scholars initially found the widespread use of
convertible bonds puzzling. Convertible bonds combine a low risk instru-
ment (a bond) with a very high risk instrument (a call option). It would
seem more attractive to potential investors with a variety of risk toler-
ances to purchase these instruments separately. 22 Investors with low risk
tolerance could stick with bonds, leaving the warrants for more specula-
tive types. Furthermore, combining the instruments creates ongoing
complexity as the issuer must determine a call policy and the investor
20. In a sample of 199 convertible bonds issued from 1980 to 1982, the mean call pro-
tection period was 295 trading days, and the median was 252 trading days, exactly one
calendar year of trading days. 79% of the bonds in the sample had some call protection.
Paul Asquith, Convertible Bonds Are Not Called Late, 50 J. FIN. 1275, 1279-80 (1995).
21. The holder does not have to wait for completion of the mechanics of the conver-
sion process to lock in realization of the conversion value. The holder can send in an order
to convert the bond and simultaneously sell short the underlying stock. When the issuer
delivers the shares from conversion of the bond, the holder can close the short position
using those shares. Of course, the holder will have to pay a commission on the short sale
and will have to pay margin interest on the shares borrowed for the short sale.
22. Professor Klein illustrates this point by an apples-oranges analogy. If a company
issues convertible bonds instead of warrants and bonds separately, it is like a grocery store
insisting on selling oranges and apples only in a fixed ratio, independent of the buyer's
preferences. Assuming that shoppers could not remarket their apples or oranges to undo
this tie-in, there will be a welfare loss, reflected in lower consumer satisfaction, lower sales,




must respond to calls both by deciding whether to tender the bond or
convert, and by portfolio rebalancing after the bond is tendered or con-
verted. Finally, it is unlikely that issuance costs explain the packaging of
convertible bonds. Instead of issuing convertible bonds, a company could
issue a package of warrants and bonds where the warrants and bonds are
separate, but are issued together in a fixed ratio. The warrants and bonds
would trade separately so that an investor who wanted just bonds or just
warrants could sell the other instrument right after issuance. Issuing the
bond/warrant package in a single transaction means that issuance fees
will be roughly similar. In fact, companies do issue such packages, but
much less frequently than convertible bonds.23
The puzzle of convertible bond issuance led to a series of popular ex-
planations that are not consistent with issuer and/or investor rationality.
For example, there is the observation that the option feature "sweetens"
a convertible bond by giving the investor a little upside to complement a
straight bond investment. This "sweetener" would make convertible
bonds especially attractive if it were free. But a rational issuer will charge
the market price for the sweetener, and, in fact, convertible bonds pay
significantly lower yields than straight bonds with the same terms.
24 If
convertible bonds were a new instrument, a period of misvaluation (e.g.,
issuers undervaluing or investors overvaluing the "sweetener") might be
understandable. But convertible bonds have been a heavily used financ-
ing device for many years, and persistent, massive misvaluation is un-
likely. Many of the purchasers are sophisticated institutions25 and many
of the issuers are represented by sophisticated investment banks.26 In
addition, beginning many years ago, both legal and finance scholars have
emphasized the defects in popular explanations that implicitly rely on
misvaluation by one or both parties.27
There are some very powerful explanations for the heavy use and pecu-
liar features of convertible bonds. Before detailing those explanations, it
is important to review certain "stylized facts" about convertible bonds,
that is, to review certain regularities in contract terms and market impact
that any explanation for the use of convertible bonds must address.
23. See John D. Finnerty, The Case for Issuing Synthetic Convertible Bonds, 4 MID-
LAND CORP. FIN. J. 73 (1986).
24. See Klein, supra note 15, at 558-59; Brennan & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 28.
25. An extreme example is Rule 144A issues. These issues may be sold only to certain
institutional purchasers. In the first three quarters of 1996, 38.1% of new convertible is-
sues coming to market were Rule 144A issues, and, as of November 1996, Rule 144A issues
accounted for 14.2% of the total convertible market. See Complications in the 144A Con-
vertible Market-Is This Issue Registered or Not?, 27 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLES SURVEY
41 (1996).
26. The weekly "Chronicle of New Issues" in the Value Line Convertibles Survey lists
nationally prominent lead underwriters for new convertible issues. See, e.g., id. at 48 (list-
ing Alex Brown, Smith Barney, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, DI, NatWest, Salomon
Brothers, and National Securities as the lead underwriters for the eight upcoming issues).
27. See e.g., Klein, supra note 15; Brennan & Schwartz, supra note 15.
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B. STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT CONVERTIBLE BONDS
Stylized facts about convertible bonds fall into two categories. First,
certain contract terms are ubiquitous, but it is not obvious why they are
consistently present. Second, empirical research has revealed that issuing
and calling convertible bonds has systematic effects on the price of the
underlying common stock.
1. The Call Feature and Call Policy
Almost all convertible bonds allow the issuer to call the bonds, usually
only after some period of call protection. Some nonconvertible corporate
bonds also have a call feature. 28 The issuer typically exercises the call
provision for a regular bond when interest rates fall enough so that, net of
issuance costs, it is better for the issuer to replace the bonds with a new
issue requiring lower interest payments. For convertible bonds, however,
the motive for calling an issue usually is to force conversion of the bonds
rather than to secure a lower interest rate.29 It is this aspect that distin-
guishes a convertible bond from a bond/warrant package. Even if the
bond in the bond/warrant package is callable, the issuer cannot force the
bondholder to relinquish the bond in exchange for stock. "Forced con-
version" is a peculiar feature of convertible debt.
Given that almost all convertible bonds have a call feature, it is neces-
sary for issuers to set a "call policy" that determines when the issuer will
exercise its option to call. The "issuer" consists of managers acting on
behalf of shareholders, or perhaps on their own behalf to the detriment of
shareholders. It is useful to begin with the simple case where there is no
agency conflict (i.e., managers act on behalf of the shareholders) and
where the only securities outstanding other than equity are the converti-
ble bonds. In this case, the optimal call policy is quite clear: The issuer
should call the bonds as soon as the value of the bonds exceeds the call
price. A premium over the call price that attaches to convertible bonds
comes at the expense of shareholders since whatever the convertible
bondholders gain, the shareholders give up.30
It is quite striking, however, that issuers often delay calling convertible
bonds until the conversion value (and market price) is significantly above
the call price. It is worth explaining the dynamics of convertible bond
pricing to make this result more clear. There are two theoretical lower
bounds on the value of a convertible bond: the "investment value" of the
bond, and the "conversion value" of the bond. The investment value of
the bond is what the bond would be worth if it had no conversion right.
This value is a lower bound on market price because the conversion right
28. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 718-19 (6th ed. 2000).
29. See, e.g., Asquith, supra note 20, at 1280-81 (115 out of 123 calls in sample were to
force conversion; the other eight appear linked to securing lower rates).
30. See Ingersoll, supra note 17, at 299. The same policy would be optimal for bonds
that are not convertible. See R. BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, supra note 28, at 718-19.
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
is a valuable option. As we have already discussed, conversion value is
the amount that the investor would realize by converting the bond and
selling the shares received at the current market price. Since the investor
always has the option of converting, a convertible bond should never sell
below its conversion value. 3 1 In fact, the convertible bond should trade
for more than its conversion value. The common stock may fall and re-
main below the point where it is worthwhile to convert the bond. If there
is no possibility of default, holding a convertible bond gives the holder a
put option: The holder can "sell" the bond back to the issuer at maturity
for the stated principal amount that is due at that time.32 This put option
has value, but calling a convertible bond with a conversion value substan-
tially above the call price, in effect, makes the option worthless. The fact
that the conversion value substantially exceeds the call price means that
the holders of called bonds almost certainly will convert their bonds in
short order. The market value of the bonds should fall to the conversion
value in response to a call, reflecting the fact that the put is now
worthless. 33
The striking fact is that firms often delay calling to force conversion.
For example, a seminal study by Jonathan Ingersoll found that the me-
dian firm delayed calling convertible bonds until the conversion value of
the bonds exceeded the call price by 43.9%.34 A call in the face of such a
huge premium will trigger conversion, and the common stock owner will
suffer dilution. The convertible bondholders will share in the upside out-
come that drove up the conversion value but will have been at least par-
tially protected (by the put feature inherent in an unconverted bond) in
the event that the outcome had been less sanguine. Management could
have called the bonds just when the conversion value of the bonds
reached the call price. At that point, the bondholders would have to con-
vert or tender. Converting would force them to share more fully in
downside outcomes by giving up their put protection while tendering
31. Some circumstances where convertible bonds do trade below their conversion
value, and reasonably so, are discussed below. See infra note 33.
32. If there is no reason to convert prior to maturity, then a convertible bond is exactly
equivalent to owning the underlying stock plus a put option (to exchange the stock at the
time of maturity for the principal amount due at that time) plus a right to whatever cou-
pons are due on the bond prior to maturity. See Ingersoll, supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
33. In practice, called convertible bonds often trade slightly below their conversion
value. See Call Protection and Likely Call Candidates, 28 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLES SUR-
VEY 313 (1997). There is an obvious reason for this phenomenon. When bonds are called,
the issuer typically is not obligated to pay the accrued interest on the bond to the holder.
However, bond trading rules require the buyer to pay any accrued interest to the seller at
the culmination of any trade. Thus, arbitrage can only support a price for the convertible
bond equal to the conversion value minus accrued interest. Buying and converting the
bonds requires paying the seller the accrued interest, so that an arbitrage profit is only
available if the arbitrageur can buy the convertible bond for less than the conversion value
minus the accrued interest, and then convert and sell the stock for the conversion value.
Of course, the transaction costs of arbitrage may require an even lower convertible bond
price (than conversion value less accrued interest) to make arbitrage profitable.
34. Jonathan Ingersoll, An Examination of Corporate Call Policies on Convertible Se-
curities, 32 J. FIN. 463, 469 (1977).
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would mean that the common stock owners would not have to share up-
side outcomes with the bondholders. When a conversion-forcing call is
delayed until the conversion value of the bonds is above the call price, the
failure to call allows the bondholders to hold the full upside share that
would be available as shareholders after conversion while retaining their
put option in the event that things go badly for the firm. The premium
value of the bond above the call price represents value transferred to the
bondholders at the expense of the common stock owners. A premium in
the range of 43.9% seems quite large.
Professor Ingersoll considers and rejects several possible explanations
for the premium and apparent delay in forcing conversion. Two of these
explanations flow from the fact that there typically is a thirty-day "notice
period" between the announcement of a call and the final date on which
the bondholder may convert to avoid the call. Assuming that early con-
version is not optimal, this delay means that the conversion value of the
bond versus the call price at the end of the notice period and not at the
announcement date is key. This fact suggests one possible explanation
for a premium: The issuer wishes to avoid the situation where the conver-
sion value is below the call price at the end of the notice period because
in that situation, the bondholders would receive a bonus at the expense of
the shareholders. Calling only after there is a premium makes that event
less likely. However, Ingersoll finds that the opposite is true: Taking the
typical thirty-day notice period into account dictates calling whenever
conversion value exceeds a level a few percentage points below the call
price. 35 It is easy to see why: Failure to call when the conversion value
increases above the call price means value is being transferred from
shareholders to bondholders. Calling the bond when this situation mate-
rializes cuts off this possibility. The danger that the conversion value will
be below the call price at the end of the notice period is more than offset
by the danger that the conversion value will move substantially above the
call price in the absence of a call.
A second possible explanation related to the notice period arises from
possible financing costs. If the call announcement is made when conver-
sion value equals the call price and the stock price falls during the notice
period, bondholders will tender for the call price instead of converting. If
the firm has to pay the call price to each bondholder, it may have to raise
funds through a new debt or equity issuance. In contrast, conversion re-
quires no commitment of funds by the company. It could be that firms
wait until the stock price is sufficiently high so that conversion is highly
likely even after thirty days of stock market action. That approach mini-
mizes the possibility of having to incur additional financing costs. Inger-
soll's results indicate that even for very risky firms where more "cushion"
is needed since a large drop in stock price over thirty days is more likely,
underwriting costs of the order of 5-20% do not come close to dictating
premia as large as 43.9%. The largest mandated premium that Ingersoll
35. Id. at 469-70.
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finds is 12.65%-that premium is for the case of a stock with an annual
standard deviation of 35%, underwriting costs that are 20% of the capital
raised, and a bond issue that converts into 20% of the equity of the
firm.
36
Finally, Ingersoll considers a tax explanation. A call that forces conver-
sion reduces debt in favor of equity and thus eliminates interest (or OID)
deductions at the corporate level. Ingersoll points out, however, that this
problem can be fixed by recapitalizing after the call. As just discussed,
the need to pay recapitalization costs does not justify the size of the ob-
served premia.
2. The Stock Price Impact of Issuance and Calls
Finance scholars have studied the stock price impact of numerous cor-
porate events, including the issuance of various kinds of securities, calls
on convertible bonds, and increases or decreases in dividend payments.
Hypotheses that rest on an information asymmetry between corporate
insiders and outside investors motivate many of these studies. Consider
the case of a firm that wishes to invest in a new project and issues new
securities to do so. If information is symmetric, this issuance should have
no price impact. The outsiders know about the new investment and know
that the firm's prospects dictate that the firm must raise outside money to
pursue it. In fact, the issuance of most types of securities results in nega-
36. Id. at 471. A recent study by Paul Asquith raises some questions about the extent
of delay and the size of the premium. See Asquith, supra note 20. Professor Asquith exam-
ines a sample of convertible bonds issued from 1980 to 1982. He removes two sets of
bonds from his sample: bonds for which conversion value exceeds the call price when call
protection expires and bonds for which the firm has an incentive to delay calling the bonds
because the after-tax cost of paying (deductible) interest on the bonds is lower than the
cost of paying (nondeductible) dividends on the stock. Adjusting the sample in this way
reduces the average call premium from around 50.2% to 25.8%. However, based on Inger-
soll's analysis, even a median premium of 15-20% is much higher than would be justified
simply by the desire to avoid underwriting costs, and the existence of a notice period calls
for a negative "premium" if underwriting costs are ignored. If managers are waiting for a
large premium as a "cushion" to insure that conversion is highly likely, their motivation
must be something much more frightening than the danger of incurring additional under-
writing costs. The discussion in the next Part considers just such a motivation.
Professor Asquith also suggests that bonds seem to be called rather soon after the pre-
mium of conversion value over the call price passes 20%. He finds that the median num-
ber of trading days for which the conversion value exceeded 120% of the call price was
only 20. Id. at 1281. However, the average was 95.7, suggesting that some calls were
delayed substantially.
Professor Asquith's results have to be read with caution because of the period he chose
to study. Convertible bonds issued in 1980-82 would be subject to accelerating interest
rates and the accompanying big drop in the stock market during those years. As discussed
in a later Part, a leading theory suggests that early convertible bond calls signal bad infor-
mation, and there was a lot of bad information during the period immediately following
issuance of the bonds. In addition, the sharp drop in interest rates following 1982 may
have motivated many of the calls. This drop would mean that firms would be eager to
refinance their outstanding debt including convertibles. They would call the convertibles
as soon as possible. Professor Asquith notes, with surprise, that several bonds in his sam-
ple were called when the call price was greater than the conversion price and explains




tive abnormal returns to the company's stock.37 A common explanation
for this phenomenon is information asymmetry: Insiders know more
about the firm's earnings prospects than outsider investors, and these in-
vestors are aware of that fact. Raising funds by issuing securities is costly,
and insiders would not do so unless they expect there is a significant
chance that internally generated funds will not pay for the investments.
Thus, issuing securities to raise funds signals negative information about
the future earnings prospects of existing firm operations. 38
There have been a large number of studies concerning the impact of
issuing or calling convertible bonds on stock prices. In the rest of this
Part, I summarize these studies by stating two "stylized facts," empirical
results of potential importance that seem well established, and one "po-
tential stylized fact." Any hypothesis or theory explaining the purpose of
convertible bonds needs to address these facts.
Stylized Fact #1: (The Issuance Hierarchy) Issuing straight debt, con-
vertible debt, and equity have significantly different impacts on a
company's stock price. The most negative abnormal returns come
from issuing equity, followed by convertible debt, and then straight
debt. Issuing straight debt may not have any negative impact at all.
Empirical studies consistently find that issuing equity results in signifi-
cantly more negative abnormal returns than issuing convertible debt.
Two recent summaries of the literature find a gap of 1-2%. 39 Taking the
abnormal returns from issuing equity to be about -3.25% and the abnor-
mal returns from issuing convertible debt to be -1.75% seems reasonable
based on the existing studies.40 In contrast, issuing straight (i.e., noncon-
vertible) debt seems to have little or no impact on the issuer's stock
price.41
37. Abnormal returns are measured by comparing actual stock performance to how a
stock is expected to perform compared to similar stocks. To measure such returns, one
needs a baseline model such as the capital asset pricing model that generates expected
returns for the stock conditional on the actual returns of all other stocks. For example,
under the capital asset pricing model, a stock with a beta of 1.5 is expected to move in the
same direction as, and 1.5 times as much as, "the market." Examining performance for a
period before and after a given event such as calling the company's convertible bonds is
called an "event study." The approach is to compare performance each day to predicted
performance (based on some model). If the sum of the daily prediction "errors" for a
period of time surrounding a particular event significantly deviates from zero for a large
sample of firms subject to that event, then there is support for the hypothesis that "abnor-
mal" returns accompany the event. If prediction errors are negative, the stocks subject to
the event did more poorly than predicted, and there are "negative abnormal returns."
38. The seminal paper along these lines is Merton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend
Policy Under Asymmetric Information, 40 J. FIN. 1031 (1985).
39. A 1986 study summarizing the empirical evidence found the average abnormal
return for issuing equity of -3.14% versus -2.07% for convertible debt. See Clifford W.
Smith, Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4
(1986). Another more recent summary of the evidence published in 1992 suggests an even
greater disparity, with average abnormal returns from issuing equity of -3.57% versus
-1.65% for issuing convertible bonds. See Stein, supra note 4, at 15-17.
40. See supra note 39.
41. See B. Epsen Eckbo, Valuation Effects of Corporate Debt Offerings, 15 J. FIN.
ECON. 119, 121, 134 (1986) (reporting a -1.7% abnormal return for convertible debt versus
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Stylized Fact #2: (The Call Effect) A conversion-forcing call causes
negative abnormal returns for the issuer's stock.
Researchers consistently have observed the negative impact of a con-
version-forcing call and the impact appears to be around -2%.42 In con-
trast, calls on nonconvertible debt seem to have no significant effect on
returns.4 3 It also appears that the abnormal negative returns from a call
are large enough so that issuing convertible debt and then calling it re-
sults in a more negative total abnormal return than issuing equity.44
However, because this result is not established enough to be character-
ized as a stylized fact,45 we will record it as a potential stylized fact:
Potential Stylized Fact: Issuing and calling convertible bonds results
in a more negative total abnormal return for the issuer's stock than
issuing equity.
C. THE NYBORG-HARRIS-RAVIV SIGNALING THEORY
The most successful comprehensive explanation for the issuance, price
effects and contract terms for convertible bonds is signaling in the face of
asymmetric information. The basic idea is that firm insiders issue con-
vertible bonds and call them in response to their inside information con-
cerning future performance. The market interprets issuance and calls to
convey information, giving rise to the negative abnormal returns that sur-
round both issuance and conversion-forcing calls.
The signaling aspects of convertible bonds divide into two "games:" a
"6conversion game" and an "issuance game." In the conversion game, in-
siders decide whether to call a convertible bond. The classic model of this
game is set out in a 1985 article by Milton Harris and Artur Raviv. 46 The
model does not rationalize the issuance of convertible bonds, but only
studies conversion policy. In a 1992 paper, Jeremy Stein showed that a
signaling game can explain the issuance decision and the issuance effects
for convertible bonds. 47 In a 1995 paper Kjell Nyborg combined the Har-
ris-Raviv conversion game with an issuance game that captures many of
an abnormal return not significantly different from zero for straight debt); Aigbe Akhigbe
et al., Valuation Effects from Issuing Zero-Coupon Debt, 22 J. Bus. FIN. & AccT. 751, 758-
59 (1995) (finding no significant abnormal returns on issuer's stock for U.S. domestic cou-
pon debt or zero-coupon debt issuance and finding no significant difference between the
two types of debt in terms of abnormal returns).
42. See, e.g., Wayne H. Mikkelson, Convertible Calls and Security Returns, 9 J. FIN.
ECON. 237 (1981); Asquith, supra note 20, at 1287.
43. See Joseph D. Vu, An Empirical Investigation of Calls of Nonconvertible Bonds, 16
J. FIN. ECON. 235 (1986).
44. See Kjell G. Nyborg, Convertible Debt as Delayed Equity: Forced Versus Voluntary
Conversion and the Information Role of Call Policy, 4 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 358, 359
(1995).
45. As Nyborg points out, there has been no formal test of this in the literature. See
id.
46. Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, A Sequential Signalling Model of Convertible Debt
Call Policy, 40 J. FIN. 1263 (1985).
47. See Stein, supra note 4.
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the features of Stein's model.48 I use a variant of Nyborg's model to test
for the impact of various tax approaches on the utility of convertible
bonds as a financing device. Because the Nyborg model incorporates the
Harris-Raviv model, I sometimes refer to the model as the "NHR model"
where the initials stand for Nyborg-Harris-Raviv. 49
In this subsection, I develop basic aspects of the model and show how
the model succeeds in explaining the features of convertible bonds and
the impact of issuance and calls. 50 In the next subsection, I consider al-
ternative explanations for the existence, nature and function of converti-
ble bonds.
In Nyborg's model, a company must fund an investment that costs I
dollars by raising funds through an issuance of securities. There are three
possible funding vehicles: zero-coupon debt ("straight debt"), zero cou-
pon convertible debt, and equity. There are four time periods: 0, 1, 2, and
3. The investment must be made at time 0 and will pay either H (a high
outcome) or L (a low outcome) at time 3. Nyborg assumes that both H
and L are greater than I and ignores discounting. As a result, the project
is a sure winner. At worst, the company will receive L, which is a profita-
ble outcome since it exceeds the amount of required investment, I. Man-
ager-insiders receive private information at times 0, 1 and 2. At time 0,
their information is either good (Go), bad (Bo), or awful (Ao). This infor-
mation tells the managers what the probability of the high outcome is at
time 3: highest for Go, in the middle for B0, and lowest for A0. At times 1
and 2, the managers receive either good (G, at time 1, or G 2 at time 2) or
bad (BI at time 1, or B2 at time 2) information concerning the probability
of the high outcome. Probabilities that are based on knowing particular
information are called "conditional probabilities." The information at
times 1 and 2 is more precise than that available at time 1. For example,
the probability of the high outcome conditional on the managers receiv-
ing good information at time 1 is at least as high as the probability if the
managers receive good information at time 0. Nyborg assumes that the
call price for the convertible bonds is zero and that the managers can call
them either at time 1 or time 2. There are no dividends on the equity nor
coupon payments on the bonds, and the conversion terms of the bonds
remain fixed. As a result, holders of convertible bonds will not volunta-
rily convert the bonds until after observing what the outcome (H or L) is
at time 3.
Investors know H, L, and I as well as how private information would
affect the probability of H occurring. However, investors do not know
directly what private information the managers have received. Investors
48. Nyborg, supra note 44.
49. Nyborg does not simply incorporate Harris & Raviv's model off the shelf. Instead,
he uses some game theoretic concepts to develop conditions under which the outcome of
the Harris-Raviv game is unique, both as a separate game and when combined with the
issuance game. See id. at 362 n.4.
50. The goal here is a heuristic explanation of the model and its results. For a more
detailed and very good explanation, the reader should refer to Nyborg's article.
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can only infer this information by observing manager behavior such as
which type of security is issued at time 0 or whether the managers call an
outstanding convertible bond issue at time 1 or 2. The most desirable
outcome would be that the issuance and call decisions of the managers
reveal, at each time, what their information is. In this case, security prices
will capture all of the information and the market will be "information-
ally efficient" in the sense that prices capture all available information.
This quality is desirable because prices will be better at guiding invest-
ment resources to their highest and best use conditional on all the infor-
mation that is available to anyone.
Informational efficiency in a setting such as the Nyborg model requires
that there be a "separating equilibrium." This concept is one of several
equilibrium concepts that is appropriate in asymmetric information mod-
els. In such models, generally there are actors of several different types,
and the observer does not know which actor is of which type. Equilib-
rium occurs if each actor settles on some behavior that is optimal given
that actor's preferences and given what that actor knows about the beliefs
and preferences of others. An equilibrium where each actor's behavior
reveals that actor's type is a separating equilibrium. In contrast, a "pool-
ing equilibrium" occurs when individuals of two or more different types
behave in the same manner so that the observer (who does not know
their types to begin with) cannot distinguish their types on the basis of
their behavior.
In the Nyborg model, the different types are managers with different
private information. For example, at time 0 there are three types: manag-
ers with good, bad, and awful information respectively. A separating
equilibrium requires that these managers reveal their types through their
actions. At time 0, there are three possible financing actions: issuing each
the three types of securities. 5' For a separating equilibrium to exist, it
must be the case that each manager type issues a distinct security. If
managers who received the bad and awful signals both issued equity,
there would be a pooling equilibrium since an observer would not be able
to distinguish between the two types based on their actions. Similarly, for
companies that have issued convertible bonds and have not yet called the
bonds, a separating equilibrium at times 1 or 2 means that managers re-
ceiving good and bad signals will exhibit different call behavior-one
type will call and the other will not.
The key result in Nyborg's paper is that there are parameters (the level
of H, L, and I; the value of the various probabilities conditional on differ-
ent private information) for which a separating equilibrium (both in the
issuance and conversion game) exists and that under certain conditions,
51. A fourth action would be to issue no securities and not to do the investment pro-ject. However, this approach would not be rational in any of the (tax or nontax) environ-
ments examined in this article. The project is a sure winner since even the low outcome
guarantees return of the investment plus a profit. No tax scheme will be considered that
burdens the funding methods so severely that it destroys this property.
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this equilibrium is unique. This article uses the Nyborg framework to
examine tax policy by considering the impact of various tax rules on the
scope of projects covered by a separating equilibrium. For these projects,
investors will be able to ascertain the private information held by manag-
ers at the time of issuance or at the time that the managers decide
whether or not to call, and security prices at those times will accurately
impound all available information. A tax policy that reduces the set of
projects for which a separating equilibrium may occur reduces the scope
for informational efficiency in the economy. Given that signaling is the
primary rationale for the use of convertible bonds, evaluating tax policy
through this kind of informational efficiency analysis makes sense.
The driving feature of the NHR model is the managers' preferences
with respect to stock prices. The managers care about stock prices at
each time (0, 1, 2, and 3) and are risk averse, but in a way that diminishes
at higher stock price levels.52 The managers prefer higher stock prices at
every particular time, but are willing to sacrifice the price at one time if
this results in a large enough increase at some other time. Decreasing
risk aversion means that the managers will be much more sensitive to
variation that involves low outcomes. Thus, the managers will see the
risk inherent in a fifty-fifty chance of $70 per share versus $60 per share
as being much more innocuous than a fifty-fifty chance of $11 per share
or $1 per share even though the monetary variation is the same in each
case. Put another way, the managers will not like projects or methods of
financing that involve the possibility of very low outcomes.
These manager "preferences" are consistent with many plausible real
world features. Low stock prices are associated with financial distress, a
situation that is likely to be harmful to a manager's immediate and long-
run career.53 Managerial compensation for each period may depend di-
rectly on the firm's stock price during that period with particularly low
compensation in the case of low outcomes. 54 Low stock prices may also
trigger a takeover that is damaging to the managers' human capital.
Armed with this knowledge about manager preferences, it is possible
to understand how the separating equilibrium in Nyborg's model comes
about.55 First, I describe the equilibrium itself. It is important to keep in
52. In technical language, the manager is risk averse and has decreasing absolute risk
aversion. In Nyborg's model, the manager maximizes w(So) + w(SI) + w(S 2) + w(S3), where
Si is the stock price at time i, and w is a concave function (w" < 0) whose second derivative
increases (becomes less negative) as the stock price increases.
53. Stein's model, in fact, keys on financial distress. In his model, prior to issuance of
new securities to fund the investment project, the firm has only equity outstanding, and a
single individual owner-manager holds all of it. Default is possible, and if it occurs, the
owner-manager suffers some fixed cost. Even if the owner-manager is risk neutral, this
feature makes the owner-manager act as a "risk averse" party since low outcomes include
an additional penalty. See Nyborg, supra note 44, at 361.
54. For example, if the package includes various stock options, these options will be
worthless if the stock price falls enough.
55. The explanation here is in "story" form. It is not a proof. Readers interested in a
more rigorous presentation should refer to Nyborg's article. The goal here is to lay some
groundwork to interpret the tax results discussed later.
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mind that a separating equilibrium will exist only for some values of the
parameters (H, L, I, and the conditional probabilities of H or L based on
the managers' private information). Nyborg shows that where a separat-
ing equilibrium exists, it is characterized by the following manager ac-
tions, conditional on their private information:
Nyborg's Equilibrium
Manager Actions Conditional on Information Received
Time Manager Information Manager Action
0 good issue straight debt
0 bad issue convertible debt
0 awful issue equity
I good do nothing
I bad call convertible debt
2 good do nothing
2 bad call convertible debt
This equilibrium is game theoretic in nature. Each player's action is
optimal taking into account the other players' actions and the informa-
tion those actions reveal, if any. Nyborg shows that, subject to certain
game theoretic concepts, this separating equilibrium is unique.56 No
other behavior pattern is stable when players take into account the ac-
tions of others.
Manager preferences shape the equilibrium above because the type of
security issued and the call policy for convertible bonds heavily influences
the stock price during the three time periods. Suppose that the low out-
come, L, is above but not far from I, the amount needed to fund the
investment. If the firm funds the project using straight debt, the low out-
come will result in a very low stock price at time 3. The company will pay
back the debt holders the amount I out of the return L, leaving L - I, a
very small amount, for the shareholders. If the managers instead issued
equity, the total amount L would be split between old and new share-
holders without subtracting out I, resulting in a higher third period stock
price. Note that L may be very large. Since managers very much dislike
the possibility of a very low stock price, they will issue straight debt only
when the probability of the low outcome is very low or zero.
Now consider convertible debt. If the low outcome occurs at time 3
and the debt was not converted, a low stock price result similar to the
result in the straight debt case will occur. However, there is an important
difference. If the managers receive negative information at time 1 or
time 2, the managers can call the convertible debt and therefore avoid the
low stock price outcome at time 3. But there is a cost to calling the con-
vertible debt: Doing so signals that the managers have "bad" private in-
formation at time 1 or 2. As a result, the stock price will drop at time 1 or
2 after a call. Also, under the assumption that "bad" information at time
56. See Nyborg, supra note 44, at 370.
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1 or 2 is "more precise" than bad information at time 0 (in the sense of
signifying a higher probability of the low outcome occurring at time 3),
the price will end up lower at the time of call than it would have if the
managers had issued equity at time 0.
Now it is easy to rationalize the time 0 aspects of the equilibrium.
Managers will issue straight debt only if the probability of the low out-
come is very low. In the equilibrium, this corresponds to the case where
the managers receive "good" private information at time 0. If the manag-
ers receive information at time 0 that the low outcome is very likely (the
"awful" information case in the equilibrium), the managers will issue eq-
uity at time 0. Issuing debt would make it very likely that there would be
a very low stock price at time 3. Issuing convertible debt would make it
possible to call the debt at time 1 or 2 to avoid the low price at time 3.
However, this option means a much lower price at time 1 and/or 2 than in
the case of an equity issuance. If the information at time 0 is "awful," the
scenario of a call is likely, and the managers will prefer issuing equity.
In the intermediate case of information at time 0 that is merely "bad"
rather than "good" or "awful," convertible bond issuance makes sense.
The probability of never facing the low outcome is much higher than in
the case of "awful" information, so that it is much less likely that the
managers will need to call the bonds at time 1 or 2 and face a big price
drop then. At the same time, the probability of the low outcome is suffi-
ciently higher than in the "good" information case that the managers will
want to have the ability to call the bonds and force conversion "just in
case."
At time 1 and 2, the managers receive much more accurate information
about the possibility of a low outcome. If this information is "bad," the
managers will want to call the bonds in the face of the high likelihood of a
very low time 3 stock price in the absence of a call. The managers will
want to do so even though the call causes a significant drop in the time 1
or time 2 stock price. The low price at time 3 is such a bad outcome, that
the managers will go to great length to avoid it.
This equilibrium clearly supports the stylized facts discussed in the pre-
vious Part. If the managers issue straight debt at time 0, investors will
infer that the managers received the good signal and will bid up the stock
price. If managers issue convertible bonds or debt, then investors will
infer the bad or awful signal respectively. Thus, equity issuance should
result in the lowest stock price at time 0, followed by convertible bond
issuance and straight debt issuance in that order. This order is exactly the
"issuance hierarchy" observed in empirical tests and in Stylized Fact #1,
stated above.
Another feature of the equilibrium is that managers call convertible
bonds at time 1 (or time 2) if and only if they receive bad information at
that time. Investors will infer the bad information from the call and will
bid down the stock price. This call effect is observed in empirical tests
and is Stylized Fact #2, stated above. If information becomes more pre-
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cise over time (so that bad information at times 1 or 2 indicates a higher
probability of the low outcome than bad or awful information at time 0),
then the sum of the stock price drop from issuing convertible bonds (ver-
sus straight debt) and from calling those bonds should exceed the drop
that would follow from issuing equity (versus straight debt). This possi-
bility matches the Potential Stylized Fact stated above: It appears that
issuing convertible bonds and then calling them creates a more negative
total abnormal return than merely issuing equity.
Having reviewed the price effects that follow from the separating equi-
librium, it is possible to fully specify the incentives of managers. If there
were symmetric information, i.e., if investors knew managers' private in-
formation, then managers would always want to issue equity. Equity in-
sures against the low outcome and ensuing low stock price at time 3.
Convertible bonds provide the second best level of insurance, since the
managers can call the bonds if the low time 3 outcome appears likely at
time 1 or time 2. When information is asymmetric, these "insurance" fea-
tures are costly. Issuing equity provides the best insurance but also sig-
nals the poorest prospects. As a result, the stock prices at times 0, 1 and 2
will be depressed. Convertible bonds also provide insurance but signal
only average prospects for the firm at time 0. This will depress stock
prices at all times compared to the case of straight debt issuance. In addi-
tion, if the call feature is used, even lower time 1 or time 2 stock prices
will ensue. In economic terminology, the asymmetric information aspect
creates an adverse selection problem that makes insurance more costly.
The best insurance vehicles signal greater need for insurance and make
the insurance more costly.
The equilibrium also provides an explanation for the observation that
at least some firms tend to delay calls beyond the point at which they
should make them on behalf of the shareholders. The equilibrium re-
quires that the managers not call the bonds when they receive "good"
information at time 1 or time 2. The managers' motivation for this strat-
egy is that not calling the bonds ensures a higher stock price at time 1 and
2. Investors perceive the failure to call as indicating that the managers'
information is "good" and bid up the stock price. It is precisely when the
stock price gets high enough to push conversion value over the call price
that classic theory suggests management should call the bonds. But in the
conversion game, the opposite may be true. Good news privately re-
ceived by managers is communicated to investors by not calling the
bonds, and the resulting price increase may create or intensify a premium
of the conversion value over the call price.
D. OTHER EXPLANATORY THEORIES
There are cogent explanations of the prevalence and purpose of con-
vertible debt other than the Nyborg-Harris-Raviv theory. This subsection
briefly discusses some of these other theories. This brevity is not meant
to reflect on the quality or empirical validity of the theories. Several of
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them may describe phenomena that do occur. However, none of them
comprehensively explain the terms and empirical impact of convertible
bonds in the way that the NHR theory does.
1. Avoiding Risk Shifting
When debt and equity are present in a firm's capital structure and the
managers are agents of the shareholders, the managers have an incentive
to engage in inefficiently risky projects.57 Consider a firm that must
choose between two mutually exclusive projects, each requiring $100 mil-
lion in investment. One project ("the low risk project") will return $105
million with certainty, and the other ("the high risk project") will return
$1 billion with 10% probability and nothing with 90% probability. As-
suming that the projects are instantaneous so that we can ignore discount-
ing and assuming risk neutrality, the first project has a net present value
of $5 million while the second has a net present value of zero. Based on
the net present value criterion, the low risk project is clearly superior.
Now suppose that the firm has $100 million in cash but has bonds out-
standing, and the bonds specify that $100 million in principal and interest
is due at a time that coincides with the payoff time for the two projects. If
the firm does the low risk project, the bondholders will receive the $100
million due for sure, and the shareholders will split $5 million. If the firm
does the high risk project, there is a ninety-percent chance that the bond-
holders will not be paid and a ten-percent chance that they will be paid in
full. The net present value of their bonds prior to the project has fallen
from $100 million (if the firm did nothing or the low risk project) to $10
million (if the firm does the high risk project). Under the high risk pro-
ject, shareholders have a ten-percent chance of making $900 million
which has a net present value of $90 million. Assuming risk neutrality,
shareholders will strongly prefer the risky project even though it has
lower net present value.
Increasing project risk typically increases downside risk and potential
upside gains. However, all of the added upside gains go to the sharehold-
ers while they bear only part of the added downside risk. As a result,
debt funding creates incentives for managers acting on behalf of the
shareholders to engage in inefficient risk taking. Recognition of this fact
ex ante means that there is an incentive for debt to include costly contrac-
tual provisions to prevent risk shifting. To the extent these provisions are
ineffective, debt will be more costly since debtholders will demand ex
ante compensation in exchange for exposing themselves to risk shifting.
Several finance scholars have pointed out that issuing convertible debt
or a package of debt and warrants addresses the risk shifting problem. 58
57. Finance scholars have recognized this problem for quite some time, and it is cur-
rently a standard item in elementary finance texts. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 28, at 516-18.
58. The leading rigorous exposition is Richard C. Green, Investment Incentives, Debt,
and Warrants, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 115 (1984). Green points out several scholars who stated
the idea earlier. Id. at 116, 125.
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The conversion feature of the convertible bonds and the warrant part of
the warrant package gives the holder a big slice of any high end gains.
This reduces the incentives of management acting on behalf of sharehold-
ers to engage in inefficient risk shifting because the upside of risky
projects must now be shared with the debtholders. Richard Green shows
that in the case where the firm faces the choice of exactly two projects,
the terms of the convertible bond or bond/warrant package can be set to
restore the net present value maximizing incentives that would exist if
there were no debt.59
The risk shifting rationale for convertible bond or bond/warrant issu-
ance is persuasive. However, by itself, it does not explain or predict the
empirical regularities surrounding the choice of security at issuance.
Avoiding risk shifting might prompt the issuance of convertible bonds for
companies that have substantial choice about risk, but this issuance
should have no impact on stock prices. 60 Even more striking, risk shifting
may be alleviated by issuing a bond/warrant package as well as by issuing
convertible bonds. The call feature does not play a role in alleviating risk
shifting. Somewhat to the surprise of commentators, despite potential tax
and other advantages, the bond/warrant package is much less common
than convertible debt.61 This fact suggests that there is some additional
or other role played by convertible bonds.
An important tax policy point also follows from considering the bond/
warrant package alternative to convertible bonds. If risk shifting is the
reason for convertible bond issuance, a tax policy that heavily burdens
these bonds will not cause much harm. As long as the debt/warrant pack-
age is free from such burdens, issuers can address the agency problems
inherent in risk shifting by using such a package.
2. Addressing Uncertainty about Risk
For some firms or enterprises, it may be difficult for investors to assess
risk, putting aside any attempt by managers to shift the riskiness of their
enterprises. The value of a straight bond tends to decline with increased
risk since increased risk often involves a higher probability that the firm
will default on bond coupon or principal payments. If investors are un-
certain about the riskiness of a firm, they will demand a risk premium (in
the form of higher coupons or yield) to purchase the firm's debt. This
problem will be especially frustrating if management believes that firm
riskiness is lower than investors fear. Michael Brennan and Eduardo
Schwartz have pointed out that a simple way to address this problem is to
issue warrants along with the debt or to issue convertible debt instead of
59. Id.
60. If management issued straight debt instead, the company would have to compen-
sate the bondholders for any potential gains from risk shifting that would accrue to share-
holders. As a result, there is no incentive to issue straight debt. The market will expect an
issuance of convertible debt or a bond/warrant package, and there will be no price effect
when this expectation is realized.
61. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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straight debt.62 Warrants and the conversion option are more valuable if
the firm is riskier.63 Combining bonds and warrants in suitable propor-
tions results in an instrument whose value is relatively insensitive to risk.
An increase in riskiness lowers the value of the bond portion, but this
drop is offset by an increase in the value of the warrant portion. Brennan
and Schwartz note that there is evidence that convertible debt is used
more heavily by firms whose risk is subject to a higher degree of
uncertainty. 64
The phenomenon just described does not depend on asymmetric infor-
mation. Managers and investors might be equally uncertain about firm
risk. In this case of "symmetric uncertainty," settling on a bond/warrant
package or convertible debt would serve to eliminate the need to pay
investors a big premium to cover the uncertainty, just as it would in the
case of asymmetric information.
Michael Brennan and Alan Kraus have considered the case of uncer-
tainty about risk in an asymmetric information setting.65 In this case,
managers know how risky a proposed investment is, but investors do not.
Brennan and Kraus demonstrate that if certain assumptions are made
about the universe of possible projects, then managers can signal the risk-
iness of the firm by choosing the terms of the convertible bond contract. 66
In particular, riskier firms will choose a higher face value and lower con-
version ratio for their convertible bond issues. That is, riskier firms will
choose to issue convertible bonds with a more prominent debt compo-
nent and less prominent option component. Later work by Brennan and
Her 67 finds some empirical support for this result: The abnormal returns
for firms issuing bonds with higher face value or lower conversion ratios
are higher (less negative). 68
Although the Brennan/Schwartz and the Brennan/Kraus theories have
some empirical support, they have some of the same weaknesses as the
risk shifting theory. In particular, neither of them explains the call fea-
ture that pervades convertible bond contracts. In both cases, conversion
is a voluntary event. As a result, both theories are as, or more applicable
62. Brennan & Schwartz, supra note 15.
63. A warrant is a call option and the conversion option is a call option with the pecu-
liar feature that the exercise price depends on the value of the debt component of the
convertible bond. Holding expected return constant, a call option is more valuable if there
is more risk. More risk means a higher probability for outcomes above the strike price of
the option and therefore a higher expected value for the option. See BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 28, at 599-600.
64. Id. at 36-37.
65. See Michael J. Brennan & Alan Kraus, Efficient Financing Under Asymmetric In-
formation, 42 J. FIN. 1225 (1987).
66. See id. at 1238-40.
67. See Michael J. Brennan & Constance Her, Convertible Bonds: Test of a Financial
Signaling Model (IFA, Working Paper No. 187, 1993).
68. The higher face value and lower conversion ratio suggests the firm is riskier, hold-
ing mean returns constant. Equity value is a convex function of firm returns: Stockholders
receive nothing until returns cover the amount payable to senior securities and then in-
crease dollar for dollar above that point. This pattern is similar to the returns of a call
option, and the value is higher if risk is greater given a fixed expected rate of return.
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to a debt/warrant package than to convertible bonds. Neither theory ex-
plains the more intensive use of convertible bonds as compared to debt/
warrant packages. In addition, neither theory explains why convertible
bonds fall in the middle of the hierarchy of announcement effects, caus-
ing more negative abnormal returns than a straight debt issuance but less
negative abnormal returns than an equity issuance.
On the other hand, it is intriguing that the Brennan/Kraus theory pro-
vides a possible explanation for the terms of convertible bonds that are
issued. These terms may be influenced by tax policy, 69 so that it is impor-
tant to ascertain whether various tax treatments might interfere with or
enhance the ability to signal firm riskiness by choosing issuance terms.
The Nyborg-Harris-Raviv theory does not explain the choice of contract
terms explicitly and therefore misses this aspect.
As mentioned above, it is important to keep the availability of the
debt/warrant option in mind when considering the impact of tax policy on
financial efficiency. If the focus is only on signaling concerning risk or on
being able to issue a package with a value that is insensitive to risk, tax
burdens on convertible debt may not be a concern. As long as these bur-
dens do not extend to debt/warrant packages, firms can signal riskiness or
immunize value from risk by issuing such a package. In summary, it
would be desirable to include the phenomena modeled by Brennan and
Kraus in assessing the impact of tax policy, but these phenomena are not
central to the peculiar role played by convertible debt, as opposed to
other financing vehicles such as debt/warrant packages. 70
II. THE TAX TREATMENT OF CONVERTIBLE DEBT
This Part begins with a description of some basic tax rules that apply to
convertible debt instruments and some of the "reform" proposals. With
that discussion in hand, the rest of this Part describes various tax alterna-
tives studied in Part III. These alternatives are simplified and do not ex-
actly coincide with current treatments or specific proposals. There are
69. See infra text accompanying note 102.
70. There is one caveat. It may be most efficient to achieve multiple signaling goals or
to signal and simultaneously immunize value from risk by using callable convertible bonds.
Issuing a callable convertible bond signals firm prospects as detailed in the Nyborg-Harris-
Raviv model. In these models, there is some latitude to vary the face value and conversion
ratio terms of the bonds: Choosing a lower face value means choosing a larger conversion
ratio. One could signal firm risk or immunize the issue against risk by choosing these
terms. This ability would be particularly useful if achieving these goals did not by them-
selves justify the extra expense (compared to a straight debt issuance, the cheapest variety)
of a specialized kind of issue (bonds/warrants or convertibles). Then, heavy tax burdens on
convertible debt might not only destroy its signaling function as described in the NHR
model, but might also destroy the ability to signal firm riskiness or to immunize issuance
value against risk. Note, however, that this case arises precisely where the value of signal-
ing firm riskiness or immunizing an issue against risk is low-too low to justify a special
issuance on their own.
It is also unclear how signaling firm riskiness (or immunizing an issuance against risk)
would interact with the signaling already present in the NHR model. Assessing this inter-
action requires a model that comprises the NHR signaling and the other phenomena simul-
taneously. No such model exists at present.
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two reasons for this approach. First, the main goal is to gain an apprecia-
tion of how taxes interact with signaling. Using simplified alternatives
emphasizes the features that are more general and, at the same time,
sheds considerable light on current and proposed rules. Second, signaling
models are complex. Even if one does the work to add a high level of
detail, it is often not clear why particular results ensue or whether the
results depend on peculiarities in the model.
A. CURRENT LAW AND REFORM PROPOSALS
1. Current Law
Convertible bonds create difficult tax law questions because of their
dual nature. Part of the convertible bond's value resides in a straight
bond and part resides in the value of the conversion right. One obvious
approach would be bifurcation, splitting the bond into two pieces and
taxing each piece according to the appropriate rules-the bond rules for
the straight bond portion and the option rules for the conversion right.
Current law partially applies this approach to bonds issued at a premium,
but otherwise does not attempt to separate the conversion right and bond
portions.
Consider first, a convertible bond issued at par. Suppose that the bond
will pay $1000 in five years, that the issuance price is $1000, and that the
conversion right is worth $200 at the time of issuance. Suppose that the
bond pays coupons of $80 per year. Bifurcation into a straight bond and
an option would call for treating this as a discount bond issued with $200
of OID plus an option sold for $200. OID would accrue at a 4.56% an-
nual rate and would result in taxable income for the holder and an equal
deduction for the issuer. If the bond were converted at any time, the
$200 cost of the option portion would be added to the basis of the stock
received. The exchange of the bond for stock would be a realization
event, resulting in capital gain or loss for the holder. The issuer could be
treated as having discharge of indebtedness income or an ordinary loss
from retiring the debt at a premium.
The actual treatment is quite different. The bond is not treated as an
OID bond.71 As a result, the issuer has no OID deductions and the
71. 1.R.C. §1272 and the accompanying regulations specify the computation of OlD
for contingent debt that includes an embedded option. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-1(c)(1),
(c)(5) (2002). Under the current OlD rules, the OlD accruing each period is the yield to
maturity applied to the adjusted issue price at the beginning of that period. So the crucial
element in determining the OlD accrual schedule is the yield to maturity. When the debt
contract gives the holder an option, the yield to maturity is computed both with and with-
out exercise of the option. The larger yield to maturity applies. In the case of an option
held by the issuer, the minimum yield to maturity applies. Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-1(c)(5)
(rule), -1(j) (Examples (5), (6)).
However, "an option is ignored [in computing yield to maturity] if it is an option to
convert a debt instrument into the stock of the issuer .... " Treas. Reg. § 1.1272(e) (2002).
Furthermore, "[tihe issue price of a debt instrument includes any amount paid for an op-
tion to convert the instrument into stock (or another debt instrument) of either the issuer
or a related party.., or into cash or other property in an amount equal to the approximate
value of such stock (or debt instrument)." Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-20) (2002). Since the value
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holder has no OID income. Conversion has no tax consequences for the
issuer, except that the issuer no longer makes coupon payments and re-
ceives the corresponding deductions. Conversion gives the holder a cost
basis of $1000 in the stock received.
Now consider a convertible bond issued at a discount. Suppose it will
pay $1000 in five years, that it is issued for $800, that it pays coupons of
$18 per year, and that the conversion right is worth $200 at the time of
issuance. Bifurcation would separate out a straight bond portion, taking
the issuance price as $600 for that portion. The $400 of original issue
discount would accrue at a 10.76% annual rate. Instead, current law
treats the amount of OID as $200, accruing at a 4.56% annual rate.72 In
addition, conversion is not a taxable event either for the issuer or the
holder.
Finally, suppose the convertible bond is issued at a premium and that
the straight bond portion of the convertible also includes an issuance pre-
mium. 73 In particular, assume that the convertible bond will pay $1000 in
five years, that it is issued for $1250, that it pays coupons of $125 per year,
and that the conversion right is worth $200 at the time of issuance. Bifur-
cation into a straight bond plus an option would treat the bond portion as
a premium bond issued for $1050, allowing the taxpayer to amortize a
premium of $50 over the life of the bond. In this case, current law accom-
plishes this precise result by requiring that the amount of any bond pre-
mium be reduced by the value of the conversion right. 74 Again,
conversion is not a taxable event either for the issuer or the holder.
Thus, if bifurcation into a straight bond and an option is the desidera-
tum, current law computes deductions from premiums and income from
of the conversion right is included in the issue price in computing OID, a convertible bond
issued at par will not have any OLD.
72. See supra note 71 (quoting applicable Treasury regulations). For a discussion and
an example, see BITMIFKER & LOKKEN, supra note 8, at 56.4.3 (example; 1997 Cumulative
Supplement No. 1) and 56.3.3 (until conversion, the issue price of a convertible bond is
allocated entirely to the debt aspect of the instrument; the conversion privilege is ignored).
73. The same rules that apply to convertible bonds issued at par also apply to converti-
ble bonds issued at a premium with straight bond components that are discount or par
bonds. See infra note 74.
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.171-2(c)(1) states that "for the purpose of determining the amount
of amortizable bond premium on a convertible bond for the taxable year, the amount of
bond premium shall not include any amount attributable to the conversion features of the
bond." The standard used to compute the amount attributable to the conversion features
is a market value standard that separates out the straight bond component. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.171-2(c)(2) states that "[t]he value of the conversion feature of a particular bond shall
be ascertained as of the time of acquisition by reference to the assumed price at which such
bond would be purchased in the open market if without the conversion features, and by
subtracting such assumed price from the cost of the bond."
If subtraction of the value of the conversion right eliminates any premium or shows that
the straight bond portion is in fact a discount bond, these Regulations eliminate the ability
to deduct any premium. Under the rules for computing OlD, there is no OlD either. See
supra note 71. As a result, the rules treat these convertible bonds in the same way as they
treat convertible bonds issued at par: There is no accrual of OlD or amortization of bond
premium even though the straight bond portion would demand such accrual or amortiza-
tion if treated separately.
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OID correctly only for convertible bonds issued at a premium whose
straight bond portion also includes an issuance premium. For convertible
bonds that are issued at discount, that are issued at par, or that are issued
at a premium with a straight bond portion that is an OID bond, some
OID is "hidden" behind the value of the conversion premium. The issuer
may choose to make this conversion premium large and thus hide more
OlD. The implications of this ability to hide OID depend on the tax rates
that apply to the issuer, to the holder, and to the marginal investor. If the
same marginal rate applies to both the issuer and the holder, changing the
bond terms to increase or decrease OID does not matter if the bond is
held until maturity. Each tax increase for the holder from accruing more
OID is exactly offset by an equal tax reduction at the same time for the
issuer. The issuer and holder can offset this transfer by changing the yield
of the bond. However, there is an asymmetric effect if conversion occurs.
If the bond is converted, the holder will have a higher basis equal to the
amount of OlD accrued and taxed, thereby reducing future capital gains
(or increasing capital losses). This higher basis will not matter if the tax-
payer has a low effective capital gains rate.75 There are no tax conse-
quences for the issuer upon conversion. 76
75. A low effective capital gains rate may apply because the investor will hold the
stock until death or because the investor has large capital loss carryovers.
76. If the bond is paid off at maturity, neither the holder nor the issuer will face any
additional tax consequences. Any potential gain or loss will have been absorbed by ac-
crued OID or amortization of the issuance premium.
If the issuer calls the bond and the holder tenders for the call price, the holder will have
a capital gain or loss after reducing the amount received by the adjusted issue price of the
bond. (The adjusted issue price generally is equal to the issue price plus accrued OlD
minus the amount of issuance premium amortized to date.) The treatment of the issuer is
more complex. The issuer cannot simply deduct the full repurchase premium.paid over the
adjusted issuance price but may only deduct the "normal call premium." I.R.C. § 249(a)
(2002). The "normal call premium" is generally defined as "an amount equal to a normal
call premium on a nonconvertible obligation which is comparable to the convertible obliga-
tion." Treas. Reg. § 1.249-1(d)(1) (2002). The call price for callable but nonconvertible
bonds generally includes a premium over the face value of the bond. Payment of this
premium is a deductible expense for the issuer, and the § 249 regulations attempt to carry
over that deductibility to convertible bonds. It is not always clear what a normal call pre-
mium would be. The Regulations provide a one-year's interest safe harbor, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.249-1(d)(2), and also permit the issuer to argue that an amount in excess of the normal
call premium "is attributable to the cost of borrowing and is not attributable to the conver-
sion feature." Treas. Reg. § 1.249-1(e) (2002).
In this article, I do not attempt to study tax effects due to the rules that apply when the
issuer calls a convertible bond and the holders tender for the call price. A call with this
result generally will be a call that is not intended to force conversion. The signaling theo-
ries that seem to explain the existence of convertible bonds and call policy envision that
calls will be made to force conversion. In fact, calls made to force tender at the call price
are rare. To induce tender at the call price, the call must be made when conversion value is
less than the call price. For example, in Professor Asquith's study of 199 convertible bonds
issued between 1980 and 1982, issuers called 123 of the bonds by December 31, 1993, but
only 8 of these calls were made when conversion value was less than the call price. See
Asquith, supra note 20, at 1280. Only 14 bonds were outstanding as of December 31, 1993,
and the remaining 64 (not called or outstanding) were bonds of firms subject to a merger
or reorganization during the study period.
Even aside from signaling theory, it is not surprising that few bonds are called to force
tender at the call price. Unless interest rates have fallen so that the firm can refinance at a
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A different situation arises if the issuer and holder are subject to differ-
ent tax rates. Suppose the issuer faces a higher marginal rate. Then in-
creasing the amount of OID by reducing the conversion premium creates
a joint gain. The issuer receives deductions and the holder has matching
income, but the deductions are subject to the issuer's higher marginal
rate. Maximum exploitation of this joint gain requires elimination of the
conversion premium so that the bond becomes an ordinary, i.e., noncon-
vertible, bond. The opposite will be the case if the holder faces higher
marginal rates than the issuer. Then, minimizing joint taxes calls for max-
imizing the conversion premium, i.e., moving in the direction of straight
stock.77
An important question is whether tax rate disparities between issuers
and holders could distort the issuance terms of convertible bonds or dis-
tort the choice between convertible bonds and either of the alternatives,
straight bonds and equity. The crucial fact needed to answer the question
is the tax rate of the marginal investor.78 If the marginal investor faces
the same marginal rates as the firm, the size of the conversion premium
will not affect the issuance price. In that case, adjusting the conversion
premium cannot lead to a joint tax saving between the marginal investor
and the firm, and the OID rules will not implicitly favor straight debt or
equity over convertible debt.
lower rate, there is a real economic loss for the shareholders for such calls since the firm is
paying the bondholders a premium for the bonds.
77. Given limited liability, straight stock is a call option with a strike price of zero. As
the conversion premium portion of the bond becomes more and more prominent, the rela-
tive value of the bond portion becomes small. As the relative value of the bond portion
approaches zero, conversion becomes certain, and the convertible bond is effectively stock.
This exact phenomenon in fact occurs for "deep-in-the-money" convertible bonds. These
bonds have a conversion value way above the payment due on maturity as a bond. Con-
version is virtually certain and the bond trades very much as if it were actually the underly-
ing shares. The only difference is that the bond coupon may exceed the dividend payments
on the stock giving the convertible bond superior cash flows. If the coupon payment is
below the dividend rate and eventual conversion is virtually certain, the holder will want to
convert immediately. The general principal that the holder of a call option should not
exercise until the expiration of the option, here at maturity of the bond, does not apply
when the underlying security pays dividends. See supra text accompanying note 18.
78. The marginal investor is a hypothetical individual who is indifferent between in-
vestments with different tax attributes. For example, if tax-exempt (municipal) bonds yield
7% while taxable bonds with the same risk characteristics yield 10%, the marginal investor
must be in the 30% bracket. With a 30% tax rate, the after-tax yield on the taxable bonds
is 7%, and the investor is indifferent between the tax-exempt and taxable bonds. Investors
in other tax brackets are "inframarginal."
The tax bracket of the marginal investor is determined by the supply of investment funds
at various tax rate levels and the demand of issuers for investment funds. For example,
high demand from municipal governments means a bigger supply of tax-exempt bonds at
any given interest rate. The municipal governments may have to sell these bonds to indi-
viduals in lower brackets to clear the market. As a result, the interest rate on the tax-
exempt bonds would increase, and the marginal investor would have a lower tax rate.
In the text, I speak as if the marginal investor is fixed exogenously. The implicit assump-
tion is that shifting the terms of convertible issues or increasing or decreasing the issuance
of convertibles relative to straight bonds and equity has no effect on the tax rate that




The Clinton Administration's proposal would defer any issuer OID de-
ductions on convertible debt until the OID is actually paid.7 9 Absent a
bond call followed by tender at the call price, an issuer typically does not
pay OID until maturity. If the bonds are converted at any point, the is-
suer would never pay the OID to the holder, and would lose the deduc-
tion forever. Finally, the provision does not exempt the holder from
paying taxes on accruing, but unpaid OID. The holder who converts will
have a higher basis as a result, but at the cost of paying taxes on the
increase at ordinary income rates.
Unless the marginal investor is subject to a zero marginal rate, this pro-
vision will tend to have an impact on both the "issuance game" and the
"conversion game." With respect to the conversion game, the provision
effectively taxes the issuer at the time of the conversion event by elimi-
nating OID deductions forever. As a result, the issuer will be less eager
to call convertible debt in order to force conversion, and the entire "in-
surance" value of being able to issue conversion-forcing calls is lower.
With respect to the issuance game, the provision makes both equity and
straight debt relatively more attractive sources of funding compared to
convertible debt.
Most convertible bonds end up being converted. 80 This fact is not sur-
prising given the dynamics of the signaling explanation for convertible
debt. If the underlying stock does well, investors will convert voluntarily.
Otherwise, if the call price is low enough, the issuer can call to force con-
version if poor performance threatens to leave little to shareholders after
paying off creditors. Given that issuers anticipate conversion with high
probability, a simple reform proposal would be just to bar any OID de-
ductions regardless of whether or not conversion actually occurs. This
approach would have the advantage of not imposing any tax penalty on
the issuer for forcing conversion.
After discussing how I will model taxes in the next Part, the Part fol-
lowing considers the impact of both of these proposals, among others, on
the conversion and issuance games that are central to the signaling ratio-
nale for convertible debt. The results do not necessarily match up with
conventional tax policy intuition. For example, policies that are not "neu-
tral" with respect to various financial instruments may result in greater
efficiency gains from signaling.
B. MODELING TAXES
The results in the next Part stem from a modified version of the Nyborg
model. As discussed above, the driving force in the model is risk aversion
on the part of managers. They prefer high stock values at each of the
four times 0, 1, 2, and 3. The only payoffs in the model occur at time 3
79. See supra text accompanying note 5.
80. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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when the firm realizes the high outcome, H, or the low outcome, L. The
model assumes investors are risk neutral and ignores discounting. As a
result, the stock price at any one of the times 0, 1, or 2 is simply the per
share expected value of the returns to equity at time 3 conditional on the
time 0, 1, or 2 information about the likelihood of the high and low out-
comes at time 3. This fact makes it convenient to add taxes by changing
the time 3 outcomes to reflect the cumulative tax consequences on each
possible outcome. These changes will reflect back through the expected
value computation to yield correct values at each of the earlier times.
Suppose, for example, that the firm calls the bonds at time 1. Under the
separating equilibrium, this lowers the probability of the high outcome at
time 3, eliminates the potential squeeze on time 3 stock prices that would
result under the low outcome in the face of unconverted bonds, and en-
sures under the Clinton Administration's proposal that the firm will
never be able to use its OID deductions. The stock price value is the
expected time 3 per share outcome conditional on conversion, on loss of
the deductions, and on the fact of a time 1 call. One can add the tax
penalty of loss of the deductions to both the low and high outcome at
time 3. The time 1 stock value right after the call will then incorporate
this penalty with 100% probability.
The main focus in the next Part will be on how various provisions
change the signaling equilibrium from some baseline state. Rather than
start with a no tax world, it is convenient to give H and L appropriate
after-tax interpretations for each thought experiment. Otherwise, com-
plex modeling of many detailed features is necessary. There are around
ten basic inequalities in the signaling equilibrium. Avoiding detail
reduces the number of inequalities and also makes interpretation of ma-
jor tendencies much easier.
The firm must finance an investment of I at time 0 using equity, con-
vertible bonds, or straight bonds. At time 0, there are N shares of com-
mon stock and no other securities outstanding. Consider first, the per
share value of stock at time 3 assuming equity financing. Redefine H, the
amount realized under the high outcome, to be the amount available to
shareholders (under pure equity financing) after both personal and corpo-
rate taxes. Thus, features such as corporate deductions for the portion of
I that is depreciable, capital gains taxes at the personal level, and corpo-
rate income taxes are all included. Redefine L, the amount realized
under the low outcome similarly. Now, the per share time 3 after-tax
return for the high outcome is:
he= N+Q"
Q is the number of shares issued at time 0 to raise the amount I. Q de-
pends on H and L since the value of shares at time 0 is the expected value
per share at time 3 conditional on the time 0 information.8 Similarly, the
81. If the firm is issuing equity at time 0, then under the separating equilibrium it
received "awful" information at that time. Defining P(HIAo) and P(L|Ao) as the
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per share time 3 after-tax return for the low outcome is:
L1e-
N+Q"
There are no explicit tax terms in either of these equations since we are
setting equity as the baseline case where all the tax effects are incorpo-
rated into H and L.
Now consider an issuance of straight debt in an amount I. Since no
conversion takes place and since the firm does not issue any new common
shares, N shares will be outstanding at time 3. However, the firm must
pay the debt holders I before paying the shareholders anything. In addi-
tion, the use of debt instead of equity may change the combined personal
and corporate level tax in the high and low outcome cases. For example,
with debt the firm can deduct coupon payments and OID, but the per-
sonal tax on these items may differ from the combined corporate and
personal tax on the same amounts under all equity financing. Generally,
the tax deviations due to debt will be proportional to 1.82 As a result, we
subtract (I+d)I instead of I where the d factor reflects the additional tax
burden due to financing the amount I through debt instead of equity.
83
probabilities that the firm realizes H or L respectively at time 3, given awful information at
time 0, the total expected value of all shares combined at time 3 will be
E(S3I A) = P(HIA,,)'H + P(L I A0)-L.
Then Q must be set such that
Q=E(S3 IAo) /(N+Q)"
where the denominator is the expected per share value at time 3 taking into account that
there will be N + Q shares outstanding at that time. Rearranging this equation results in a
simple expression for Q as a function of H and L:
Q N.I
P(HIA,)'H+P(LIAo)'L-I
82. For example, suppose that rates on coupon income exceed the combined personal
and corporate tax on the same amount of income in the all equity case. The coupon in-
come involved will be proportional to the face amount of debt, 1. Suppose that this pro-
portion is s and that rates on coupon debt are higher by the amount t. Then, the tax
adjustment will be s-tI.
83. One feature that may appear strange is that the model does not explicitly allow for
coupon income or OID. The model assumes that interest rates are 0, and no one discounts
future values for the time value of money. This feature is harmless for modeling the tax
policies of interest here. The critical feature of these policies is not that they change the
timing of income or deductions, but that they make tax treatment dependent on the choice
of instrument or on whether or not a convertible bond is called. Some of the choice of
instrument differences may flow from timing differences, but these may be summarized via
factors such as the d factor for debt. In examining a signaling equilibrium, the crucial tax
features are those that make signals more or less costly. The signals in the model here are
the type of security issued at time 0 and the call policy for convertible bonds. Thus, differ-
ential treatment of instruments matters, but it does not matter how the differences come
about.
There are models that consider debt maturity (long-term versus short-term) as a signal.
See Mark J. Flannery, Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice, 61 J. FIN.
19 (1986). Adding taxes to such a model would make tax timing more important. The
potential impact of considering signaling by choice of maturity and its interaction with the
signaling discussed in the text is very complex. I discuss these issues in the Appendix. See
infra text accompanying notes 113-22.
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Now the per share time 3 after-tax returns for the high and low outcomes
in the case of straight debt issuance at time 0 are:




Finally, consider the case of convertible bonds. In this case, we must
specify the terms of the convertible bond contract. Assume that the
bonds promise to pay a total of M at maturity and that the conversion
rate is r. For convenience, suppose that each bond has a face value of $1,
so that there are M bonds issued, and these bonds convert into rM shares
of stock. The parameters r and M are not independent. In order to raise
I at the time of issuance, a lower M requires a higher r. In other words,
reducing the straight debt feature of the bond requires increasing the
value of the conversion feature. We will adjust for taxes through the
quantity cM where c is the adjustment parameter. The idea is that adjust-
ments in factors such as the deductibility of OID will create an increase
or decrease in tax due that is proportional to M. We will model the "con-
version tax penalty" inherent in the Clinton Administration's proposal by
making this adjustment if and only if the bond is converted. 84 We will
also consider a "general tax penalty" on convertible bonds that would
deny OID deductions whether or not the bonds are converted.
Given a choice for M, the conversion ratio r will depend on H, L, M, c,
and the probabilities for H and L conditional on receiving "bad" informa-
tion at time 0.85 Replacing r using the appropriate formula yields the
following time 3 share values for the case where the bonds are converted:
84. A key feature of the Clinton Administration's proposal is that the firm loses its
OlD deductions if the bonds are converted. One could add a general term, similar to the
(1 + d) term applied to straight debt, to model tax discrepancies that arise from using
convertible debt instead of equity under current law. However, I include no such general
term because none of the simulations in the next Part turn on such discrepancies.
85. Recall that the separating equilibrium requires the firm to issue convertible bonds
at time 0 if the information received is "bad" as opposed to "good" or "awful." Consider
the case where conversion takes place so that there will be a tax penalty of cM. Defining
P(H I Bo) and P(LI Bo) as the probabilities of receiving H and L, respectively, at time 3,
conditional on receiving "bad" information at time 0, the expected total return for the
company at time 3 is: E(R3 I Bo)=P(H I Bo).H+P(L I Bo).L-c.M.
Then r must be set such that
rM-=
E(R 3 I Bo)/(Mr + N)
where the denominator is the expected per share value at time 3 taking into account that
the investors will have converted the bonds so that there will be N + Mr shares outstanding
at that time. Rearranging this equation results in a simple expression for r as a function of
H, L, M and c:
N.IrM= P(H[ Bo)'H + P(L I Bo).L-c.M-I
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h = (H-cM).[P(H I B)-H+P(L I Bo).L-c.M-I]
NP[(H I Bo).H + P(L I Bo).L-c.M]
1 (L-cM).[P(HI B) H+P(L I Bo).L-c.M-I]
N.[P(H I Bo).H +P(L I Bo).L-c.M]
In the separating equilibrium, the bonds always are converted if the out-
come is high. If the outcome is low, and the bonds are not converted, the
per share value at time 3 is:
L-M
N
One important aspect that is not present in the model is the choice
between discount debt and par or premium debt. This choice is relevant
to reform ideas such as the Clinton Administration's proposal because
that proposal aims only at OID deductions and not at the deduction of
coupon income. An issuer can avoid this type of provision by issuing par
or premium convertible debt. The difference between these debt types is
a difference in debt maturity. Discount bonds involve delayed payment
compared to coupon bonds. In effect, discount bonds have a later matur-
ity date than coupon bonds.
The choice of debt maturity may itself be a signal, and there is exten-
sive literature on whether maturity can be an effective signal and on
whether maturity choice has an impact that is observable in abnormal
stock returns at issuance.8 6 These issues are complex, and I discuss them
at length in the Appendix.
The resolution of the issues affects the interpretation of the results in
the next Part. If maturity choice has no signaling or abnormal stock re-
turn effects, then the Clinton Administration's proposal may not matter
much because issuers can switch to par or premium convertibles. In that
case, the results in the next Part are best interpreted as applying to hypo-
thetical provisions that deny OID and coupon deductions for convertible
debt: the conversion tax penalty variation denying the deductions only if
there is conversion and the general tax penalty denying the deductions
regardless of whether or not conversion occurs.
III. RESULTS: THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE
SIGNALING EQUILIBRIUM
The key question in a signaling model is whether there is a separating
equilibrium. The existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium pro-
motes informational efficiency: By observing manager actions, investors
can infer private information held by managers. As a result, market
86. See supra note 83 and the Appendix, infra text accompanying notes 113-22.
20031
SMU LAW REVIEW
prices will capture this private information as well as all other available
information.
Generally, a separating equilibrium will exist only for some values of
the parameters in the model. The key parameters in the Nyborg-Harris-
Raviv model are:
(1) H, the high outcome;
(2) L, the low outcome;
(3) 1, the amount of investment;
(4) the probabilities of receiving H or L conditional on various private
information that managers might receive;
(5) manager preferences.
A separating equilibrium requires that a number of inequalities be
true. Each inequality reflects a managerial decision (e.g., call the con-
vertible bond at time 1), and the inequality guarantees that the decision
will send the signal required by the separating equilibrium.
This Part will proceed through simulations based on several extended
examples. Particular assumptions about conditional probabilities and
manager preferences will make the governing inequalities easy to under-
stand. However, the interpretation of these inequalities will be the same
as if they were in a more abstract, less comprehensible form.
Since the principal nontax purpose of convertible debt appears to be
signaling, a key policy issue is how various tax proposals affect the scope
of any separating equilibrium. Particular provisions may result in a re-
duced or an increased set of projects for which a separating equilibrium is
possible. Since the separating equilibrium comes about in part from the
issuance choice (between convertible debt, equity, or straight debt), the
tax treatment of other instruments matters also.
Unfortunately, we do not know either the list of all potential projects
or the list of projects for which convertible debt signaling is important.
The approach here is to fix manager preferences, conditional probabili-
ties, and the amount of investment I, and then examine how tax policy
affects the size and shape of the region in H-L space where a separating
equilibrium exists. In other words, the goal will be to find the set of pairs
(H, L), such that a firm can signal its type, and then see how this set is
affected by taxes.
Managers choose which security to issue and when to call convertible
bonds. As a result, manager incentives are crucial. Conditional on their
information, managers must prefer the actions that are consistent with a
separating equilibrium, as described in the table above. 87 In the model,
manager preferences depend on stock prices in the sense that managers
maximize:
E[w(So)+w(S1)+w(S 2)+w(S 3)]
87. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
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where Si is the stock price at time i, w(.) is a risk averse utility function,
and E[.] is the expectation operator. In other words, managers maximize
the sum of the expected utilities of the stock price at the each of the four
times.
In the simulations below, w(x) = ln(x) is each manager's utility func-
tion. As required by the model, this utility function implies risk aversion
at all price levels and greater risk aversion at low price levels. The quali-
tative features of the results are not sensitive to the exact form of the
manager's utility function, and using a logarithmic function makes the
inequalities that characterize equilibrium easy to understand.
The simulations use particular conditional probabilities. First, the sig-
nals at time 2 will be unambiguous: A "good" signal at time 2 implies that
the high outcome will occur for certain, and a "bad" signal at time 2 im-
plies that the low outcome will occur for certain. In addition, a "good"
signal at any of the earlier times, time 0 or time 1, implies that there will
be a good signal at all future times.88 The signaling equilibrium in the
Nyborg-Harris-Raviv model splits into two parts: the conversion game
and the issuance game. There are two sets of simulations below. One set,
the "conversion game simulations," focuses on the conversion game
alone. The other set, the "full game simulations," focuses on the com-
bined issuance and conversion games.89 The probability of receiving a
good signal in the period following a bad signal is .5 in the full game
simulations and .8 in the conversion game simulations. The probability of
a good signal conditional on receiving awful information at time 0 is .4 in
the full game simulations. Given these conditional probabilities, it is pos-
sible to compute all the others.
Changing the conditional probability assumptions would affect the ex-
act quantitative results, but the article draws qualitative conclusions that
would not change if the results reflected different conditional probability
assumptions. The assumptions about time 2 conditional probabilities sim-
plify the model significantly. These assumptions imply that after receiv-
ing the time 2 signal, the managers will know with certainty what the
outcome will be at time 3. In equilibrium, a "bad" signal at time 2 means
the managers will call the bonds and thereby force conversion. 90 If man-
agers receive the "good" signal at time 2, the high outcome will occur at
time 3 and bondholders will convert voluntarily. Thus, in equilibrium,
conversion is certain to occur. This fact makes analyzing the issuance
game much easier. It also is true that most convertible bond issues do
end up being converted. 91
The next subsection analyzes the conversion game and the final subsec-
tion of this Part analyzes the full game. Although this Part also includes a
88. Thus, a good signal at any time implies that the high outcome is certain to occur.
89. The issuance game includes the conversion game as a subcomponent. It is impossi-
ble to analyze the issuance game in isolation.
90. The call forces conversion because the call price is zero.
91. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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great deal of interpretation of the results, some of the interpretation is
left to the next Part.
A. THE CONVERSION GAME
1. The Results
The separating equilibrium demands that managers will call the bond
issue at time 1 or time 2 if they receive a "bad" signal at that time, and
will not call if they receive a "good" signal. For this to coincide with
manager preferences, four groups of inequalities must hold:
Group (1): At time 2, a call reduces the time 2 stock price thereby
lowering managers' expected utility. However, a call increases the
time 3 price and the associated expected utility of that price. If the
managers receive a "good" signal at time 2, the expected utility gain
from the higher price at time 2 due to not calling must exceed the
expected utility gain at time 3 that would result from calling. This
requirement gives rise to two sets of inequalities, one conditional on
having received a "bad" signal at time 1 and the other conditional on
having received a "good" signal at time 1.92
Group (2): If the managers receive a "bad" signal at time 2, the
expected loss in utility from the drop in the time 2 stock price from
calling must be less than the expected gain in utility from the in-
crease in the time 3 stock price. This requirement gives rise to two
sets of inequalities, one conditional on having received a "bad" sig-
nal at time 1 and the other conditional on having received a "good"
signal at time 1.93
Group (3): If the managers receive "good" news at time 1, then
the sum of the expected utility of time 1, 2, and 3 stock prices must
be higher if the managers do not call the bonds at time 1.94
Group (4): If the managers receive "bad" news at time 1, then the
sum of the expected utility of time 1, 2, and 3 stock prices must be
higher if the managers call the bonds at time 1.95
These four groups, totaling six inequalities, boil down to just three ba-
sic inequalities given the assumptions set out above concerning condi-
tional probabilities and manager preferences. Before stating these
inequalities, the following list sets out some notation:
H = high outcome
92. See Harris & Raviv, supra note 46, at 1277 (equations (Al) and (A2)).
93. See id. at 1278 (equations (A3) and (A4)).
94. See id. (equation (A5)).
95. See id. (equation (A6)).
If the managers call the bonds at time 1, there will be no signaling possibility (using a
call) at time 2. As a result, investors will not be able to infer at time 2 the information
("good" or "bad") that managers learned at that time, and the scheme will not fully reveal
the managers' private information to the market. We nonetheless refer to this outcome as
part of "the separating equilibrium," with the justification that the scheme utilizes the full
capacity of the convertible instrument to signal private information. That capacity includes




L = low outcome
M total face value of convertible debt = number of bonds, given $1
face value each
r = conversion ratio
N number of shares outstanding prior to conversion
c = tax penalty factor at time 3 if bonds are converted
P(G I B) = the probability of getting good news conditional on bad
news in the previous period
P(B I B) = the probability of getting bad news conditional on bad
news in the previous period
IN = (L - M)IN
hc= (H - cM)I(N + Mr)
c= (L - cM)I(N + Mr)
3 = (H - cM)I(L - cM)
I state each inequality first in a form that corresponds closely with the
expected utility terms from the managers' preferences and then in a form
that shows the dependence on basic parameters such as M, N, L, H, and




This constraint is met trivially since H is the high outcome and L is the
low outcome.
The two inequalities in Group (2) end up being the same and yield the
second basic inequality:
In (hc)-ln(lc)<ln(c)-ln(N) (CG2)
L-cM 2NL 2 > [H-cM] H(N+Mr)(L-M)
Since H > L, it is obvious that increasing c, the tax penalty factor, will
make it harder to meet the inequality. 96
The inequality in Group (4) is the third basic inequality:
2.[In(P(G I B)hc+P(B I B)l,)]+P(G I B)ln(hc)+P(B I B)ln(Ic)>
2.[P(G I B)ln(hc)+P(B I B)ln(1c)]+ln(h,) (CG3)
3 1+P(GIB)< [P(G I B)3+1-P(G 
I B)] 2
It turns out that increasing c makes it easier to meet this inequality. This
result follows from the assumption that the managers are less risk averse
at higher stock price levels. It also is easy to understand intuitively since
the Group (4) inequality is driven by risk averse managers wanting to
96. Increases in c cause the term in square brackets on the left hand side in the second
version of (CG2) to fall more than the term in square brackets on the right hand side.
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avoid a very low stock price outcome at time 3. Adding in a tax penalty
makes this outcome even lower and the managers' risk aversion increases
at lower stock price ranges.
Algebraic examination of the inequalities reveals that the tax penalty
tightens the second basic inequality and loosens the third. The tax pen-
alty has no effect on the first basic inequality, and, in any event, this ine-
quality is not binding.97 The overall effect is therefore ambiguous.
Added insight is possible through looking at a graph of the region in
which the separating equilibrium exists. Before doing so, I discuss the
algebraic results for the more general form of the tax penalty, that is,
denial of OID deductions on convertible bonds whether or not the holder
converts the bonds.
The only algebraic difference that considering the more general form
of the penalty makes is to alter the return in the case where the bonds are
not converted. In equilibrium, conversion occurs if the outcome is high.
As a result, the only change is in the formula for IN, the time 3 value of
the stock if there was no conversion and the low outcome occurs. The
more general form of the tax penalty means that we must subtract the tax
penalty from this outcome. The new formula for IN is (L - (1 + c)M)IN,
instead of (L - M)IN. 1N enters into the second of the three basic inequal-
ities. Adding in the tax penalty lowers 1N, and it is clear from the first
equation in (CG2) above that the impact of lowering IN is to make the
constraint easier to satisfy.
There is one subtlety of the model that requires explanation with re-
spect to the general form of the tax penalty. The model assumes no de-
fault, so in the absence of the penalty, M must be less than L. There is
more likely to be a signaling equilibrium, however, if M is close to L since
that means the stock price will be very low if the low outcome occurs and
the bonds remain unconverted. The possibility of this very low stock
price will make risk averse managers more eager to call the bonds when
they receive bad information at times 1 or 2. Subtracting the penalty
from the low outcome when the bonds remain unconverted, means that,
to avoid default, L must be greater than M, the face value of the bonds,
by at least cM, the amount of the penalty. If a project has a lower value
of L, the issuer must reduce M. A lower M means that the issuer must
increase either the bond coupons or the conversion ratio, r, in order to
raise the required investment amount, I.
Either of these changes leads to what I will call "the disappearing OID
effect." Previous discussion indicated that conversion value "hides"
OID.98 Increasing the coupon rate combined with reducing the amount
due at maturity would replace OID income with coupon income. In the
model there are no coupons, and the adjustment to a lower face value is
an increase in the conversion ratio. Under the Clinton Administration's
97. When H > L, the third basic inequality is not met until H exceeds some level. As a
result, if the third basic inequality is satisfied, so is the first.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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proposal, the tax penalty of denying a deduction for OID falls only on
OID. So reducing the face value reduces the amount of the penalty. This
fact will be important in explaining some of the results.
The following figure indicates for each value of L which values of H
admit the separating equilibrium.99 The lines are the borderlines for the
second and third basic inequalities, labeled CG2 and CG3, for both tax
cases and a base case where neither tax penalty applies. The second basic
inequality is met below the solid lines, labeled CG2 in the legend. The
third basic inequality is met above the dotted lines, labeled CG3 in the
legend. The first basic inequality is met throughout the plotted area since
this inequality only requires that H be larger than L.
In the base case the two critical lines are denoted by solid circles. The
region where a separating equilibrium exists is the triangle above the
dotted line and below the solid line. Adding the tax penalty at conver-
sion shifts the dotted line down, reflecting the relaxation of the third basic
inequality, and shifts the solid line down, reflecting the tightening of the
second best constraint. The overall change indicates the net effect of ad-
ding the tax penalty: Some projects with lower values for the high out-
come now admit the separating equilibrium, but others with larger values
for the high outcome are excluded. The general penalty results in the
same relaxation of the lower dotted constraint as the conversion tax, but
also results in what appears to be a considerably relaxed upper solid
constraint.
This later result is largely an illusion. In the general tax penalty case, all
outcomes are shifted down by the penalty. If we shift the general tax
penalty inequality lines to the left by cM, the amount of the penalty, these
lines would nearly coincide with the lines in the base case.100
A potentially important point is that the expansion of the projects at
the bottom of the region caused by the conversion tax penalty may be
much more significant than the loss of projects at the top. The reason for
this possibility is that the issuer can choose M, the total face value of the
bonds, and then adjust the conversion ratio to ensure that the issue raises
99. The simulation is based on the following assumed values for various parameters:
convertible debt face value M = 1050
conversion ratio r =.5
pre-conversion shares outstanding N = 2750
tax penalty factor c = .05
conditional probability P(G I B) = .8
The tax penalty factor is quite modest, being only 5% of face value.
Fixing M and r, but allowing the tax penalty to vary, means that the amount raised at issuance
will vary among the tax penalty cases. A larger tax penalty lowers the expected returns upon
conversion (or across all outcomes in the case of the general penalty) and thus reduces the initial
value of convertible bonds issued with a fixed M and r. Requiring that the amount of invest-
ment, 1, be fixed, e.g., by fixing M and allowing r to adjust so that the issue may be sold for I.
makes very little difference. The ensuing diagram and accompanying explanations would be
nearly identical.
100. The only difference would be that both lines for the general tax penalty case would
be above the corresponding lines for the base case by the amount of the tax penalty. Thus,
the general tax penalty is more restrictive at the bottom (third basic inequality constraint)
of the region and somewhat less restrictive at the top (second basic inequality constraint).
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the required amount. As the low outcome approaches M from above, the
solid lines (reflecting the second basic inequality) run off to infinity. This
behavior means the proper choice of M for a given L ensures that H, the
high outcome, can be as high as desired without losing the separating
equilibrium. 1°] Thus, if there is any conclusion that can be stated here, it
is that the conversion tax penalty tends to increase the scope of the sepa-
rating equilibrium in the conversion game. However, this conclusion
rests, at least partially, on the ability to shift the terms of the convertible
debt contract (e.g., by lowering the face value, M, and increasing the con-
version ratio, r). If, as claimed by Brennan and Kraus, choice of these
101. This flexibility may be exaggerated in the model here as compared to "real life."
The very high values of H are admissible in the equilibrium because when L gets close to
M, the third period stock value will be extremely low if there is no conversion. The com-
pany will be close to defaulting on the bonds. Actual default or being at the point of
default would mean the theoretical value of the stock is zero. For managers with logarith-
mic utility, as the stock price approaches zero, utility goes to minus infinity. The second
basic inequality arises out of the Group (2) inequalities that ensure that the manager will
call the bonds upon receipt of bad information. Setting M to move arbitrarily close to
default when the low outcome occurs without prior conversion, one can make manager
distaste for a "near death experience," where the stock plunges to near zero, as intense as
one needs to induce the manager to call when information is bad. In the "real world,"
there are many stochastic influences on the outcomes, and it is doubtful one can step so
close to the edge of default without having a significant chance of actual default. The fear
of that outcome may be so intense that no manager would be willing to move M that close
to the anticipated value of L.
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terms also has a signaling function, the conclusion may be incorrect. 10 2
More generally, there is a "Brennan/Kraus caveat" whenever an argu-
ment rests on being able to shift the terms of the convertible debt.
Altering the terms of the convertible debt contract also can make the
two tax cases very similar. The following figure indicates the result when
face value, M, is reduced to MI(1 + c) in response to a general tax penalty
on convertible debt. In each case, the initial investment, I, is held con-
stant. Thus, the reduction in face value from M to MI(1 + c) requires an
increase in the conversion ratio, r, to ensure that the firm can issue the
bonds for I in the first place. This adjustment in face value makes the
accessible values of L (subject to a no bankruptcy constraint) the same
for both tax cases so that the figure presents a truer comparison of the
two taxes than the figure for the unadjusted face value.
From the figure, it is clear that the inequality borderlines for the two
taxes are nearly identical. The borderlines for the general tax penalty are
slightly closer to the base case borderlines. The reason for this phenome-
non is the "disappearing OID effect." Increasing the conversion ratio
and reducing M reduces the amount of OID per bond and therefore
reduces the penalty. Not surprisingly, this shifts the result in the direction
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102. See supra text accompanying note 65. The model here does not incorporate the
Brennan/Kraus type of signaling.
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2. Interpreting the Results
If one ignores any restrictions on the choice of terms in the convertible
bond contract, then the model suggests that the conversion tax penalty
expands the set of projects consistent with the separating equilibrium in
the conversion game. The general tax penalty, after taking into account
an adjustment in face value of the bonds, falls in between the base case
and the conversion tax penalty because of the "disappearing OID effect."
It is clear that these results are subject to the Brennan/Kraus caveat:
The choice of the convertible bond terms may themselves play a signaling
role. In effect, there are additional constraints that do not appear in the
pictures above. This caveat leads to a much more general point. There
are many ways for managers to convey information, some involving sig-
naling and some not. First, there is the public release of information.
Some of this information release has enhanced credibility because of the
penalties present in governing securities law. Second, there are many po-
tential signaling devices. These include dividend policy, 10 3 managerial
ownership of shares,' 0 4 and the choice of maturity for debt, 0 5 among
others. None of these items are present in the model here.
Convertible debt may provide some signaling capability that either is
not available otherwise or is less costly than alternative methods. But it is
not easy to figure out what the signaling domain for convertible debt is or
how much the cost saving might be. For example, it may be the case that
there is a cheaper signaling device available for the projects that seem to
be added to the separating equilibrium by the conversion tax penalty. In
that case, the apparent conclusion that the tax adds projects to that equi-
librium may not have any policy implications. We do not really know
which parts, if any, of the triangular regions where a separating equilib-
rium is possible in the figures above, are important because they are not
covered by alternative signaling or nonsignaling methods.
Completing the conversion game by adding on the issuance game in the
next subsection illustrates these very points. The issuance game adds six
new inequality constraints. In some of the examples, one of the conver-
sion game constraints is extraneous: It does not define the region where
the separating equilibrium is attainable. Given that a constraint may be
extraneous, the fact that tax policy affects the constraint may not matter
absent a big enough effect that the constraint supplants other constraints
that currently define the critical region.
B. THE FULL GAME
Overlaying the issuance game on the conversion game adds six new
inequality constraints that limit the set of projects for which a separating
103. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim, Tax Policy and the Dividend Puzzle, 22 RAND J.
ECON. 455 (1991); Miller & Rock, supra note 38.
104. See Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Information Asymmetries, Financial Struc-
ture, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371 (1977).
105. See Flannery, supra note 83.
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equilibrium exists. The separating equilibrium requires that the firm is-
sue straight debt, convertible debt, or equity if it receives good, bad, or
awful information respectively at time 0. For each of the three types of
information there are two constraints. For example, if the information is
awful, then one inequality will assure that managers will issue equity in-
stead of straight debt and the other will assure that they issue equity
rather than convertible debt. In each case, the inequalities center on the
sum of the managers' expected utilities over the stock price in each of the
four periods. These expected utilities are conditional on the information
received at time 0 since that information influences the probabilities of
various stock price outcomes.
1. The Results
Before stating the inequalities, the following list sets out the relevant
notation for convenience.
I = the time 3 stock price if the low outcome occurs, the firm issued
convertible bonds, and investors converted the bonds
1N = the time 3 stock price if the low outcome occurs, the firm issued
convertible bonds, and investors did not covert the bonds
h = the time 3 stock price if the high outcome occurs, and the firm
issued convertible bonds
le = the time 3 stock price if the low outcome occurs, and the firm
issued equity
he = the time 3 stock price if the high outcome occurs, and the firm
issued equity
,= the time 3 stock price if the low outcome occurs, and the firm
issued straight debt
h= the time 3 stock price if the high outcome occurs, and the firm
issued straight debt
A0 = the firm receives awful information at time 0
Bo = the firm receives bad information at time 0
Go = the firm receives good information at time 0
x = P(G IB) = the probability of receiving good information this period
conditional on receiving bad information the prior period
z = P(G, I Ao) = the probability of receiving good information at time 1
conditional on receiving awful information at time 0
"SD" stands for straight debt
"E" stands for equity
"CD" stands for convertible debt
I will denote the six inequalities by an expression indicating the issu-
ance choice required by the separating equilibrium and indicating the
time 0 information received. For example, SD > E, Go will indicate the
inequality arising from the requirement that managers issue straight debt
instead of equity if they receive good information at time 0.
The first two inequalities guarantee that managers will issue converti-









(CD > E, Bo)
> 31n[(z+x(1-z))he+(1-z)(1-x)le]
+(x+(x(1-x))lnhe+(1-X) 2fle)
The left hand side of each equation is the sum of the expected utilities of
the stock prices at each time conditional on receiving "bad" information
if convertible debt is issued. The right hand sides are the corresponding
sums of expected utilities if the managers issue straight debt or equity,
respectively.
The next two. inequalities guarantee that managers who receive "awful"










The left hand side of each equation is the sum of expected utilities of the
stock prices at each time conditional on receiving "awful" information if
equity is issued. The right hand sides are the corresponding sums of ex-
pected utilities if the managers issue convertible debt or straight debt,
respectively.
The final two inequalities guarantee that managers who receive "good"
information at time 0 will issue straight debt rather than convertible debt
or equity, respectively:
41nh, > ln [(1-x) 21+(x+x(1-x))h]+31nh (SD>CD, Go)
41nhs > 31n[(z+x(1-z))he+(1-x)(1-z)le]+lnhe (SD>EGo)
The left hand side of each equation is the sum of expected utilities of the
stock prices at each time conditional on receiving "good" information if
straight debt is issued. The right hand sides are the corresponding sums




None of these equations have any 1N term, the term expressing the
stock price if the outcome is low and there was no conversion. In the full
game, conversion occurs for certain, and the 1N outcome is irrelevant to
computing expected utility as of time 0. Expected utility conditional on
time 0 information and conditional on the various issuance alternatives
determines which alternative managers will pick. The only difference be-
tween the conversion tax penalty and the general tax penalty is that the
latter results in a lower value of /N.1 0 6 Therefore, the issuance inequalities
are the same for the two taxes.
The tax terms under either tax only affect the stock price if managers
issue convertible bonds. In each case, a higher tax results in lower values
of the time 3 stock prices, h and 1, corresponding to the high and low
outcomes respectively, in the case, where the managers issue convertible
bonds. 10 7 The stock prices at each time are expected values based on the
time 3 stock prices. Thus, each of the two taxes lowers stock prices at all
four times in the case where managers issue convertible bonds. The two
taxes have no effect on the stock prices if the managers issue other securi-
ties instead. As a result, the two taxes affect only four of the six inequali-
ties, in particular, the four that involve convertible bonds. The direction
of the effects is clear: Since the taxes place a relatively heavier burden on
convertible bonds, the first two inequalities are less likely to be satisfied
and the third and fifth inequalities are more likely to be satisfied. The
first two inequalities ensure that the managers will issue convertible
bonds upon receiving "bad" information at time 0. Taxes that lower stock
prices in all periods following convertible bond issuance make it harder to
satisfy these inequalities. The third and fifth inequalities guarantee that
managers will issue equity and straight debt, respectively, instead of con-
vertible debt when their time 0 information is "awful" or "good," respec-
tively. By reducing the stock prices that will occur conditional on
convertible bond issuance, the two taxes make it easier to satisfy these
inequalities.
As is the case for the conversion game, the overall impact of the two
taxes is not clear. The taxes tighten some inequalities and loosen others.
However, the following table shows that the taxes can cause a drastic
shrinking of the set of projects for which there is a separating
equilibrium.' 08
In the base case, the region where there exists a separating equilibrium
is the interval of high outcomes between 1144.60 and 4865.27. The con-
version game constraints determine this region. None of the six issuance
inequalities restricts the region. Adding the conversion tax penalty
106. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
107. This fact is obvious from observing the impact of a higher tax penalty parameter, c,
in the equations for h and 1. See supra text accompanying note 85.
108. The final column covers both the general tax penalty case and the conversion tax
penalty case except for the conversion game constraints CG2 and CG3. The general tax
penalty is large enough to cause default if it is applied when the low outcome occurs and
investors have not converted the bonds. In that case, the CG2 constraint is undefined.
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Restrictions on High Outcome (H) Required for Separating Equilibrium
(L = 100, 1 =99, M = 98, N =300)
(P(G I B) = .5, P(G, I A,,) = .4)
Penalty Tax Cases
Inequality Base Case (c = .2; b = 0)
CD > SD, B0  > 234.76 > 1173.51
CD > E, B0  > L = 100 > 1878.58
E>CD, A0  > L=100 >L=100
E > SD, A0  > 240.09 > 240.09
SD>CD, G0  > L= 100 >L= 100
SD> E, G0 > L= 100 > L=100
CG2 < 4865.27 < 3115.04
CG3 > 1144.60 > 939.86
makes the first two issuance inequalities much more restrictive, and the
second of these two replaces the CG3 conversion game inequality in set-
ting a lower bound of 1878.58 for the region. The upper bound of 3115.04
is tighter than in the base case, but is determined by the same conversion
inequality, CG2, that determines the upper bound in that case.
The figures for the issuance constraints in the base case indicate that
the only potential restriction arising from these constraints is due to the
first and fourth constraints. Both of these constraints require managers
to issue some security other than straight debt. It would seem that a tax
that put an extra, non-neutral burden on straight debt would loosen these
constraints. That supposition is correct as the following table indicates.
Restrictions on High Outcome (H) Required for Separating Equilibrium
The Impact of a Nonneutral Tax Disfavoring Straight Debt
(L = 100, I 99, M = 98, N =300)
(P(G IB) = .5, P(G, I A,) = .4)
Base Case Base Case
Normal Tax on SD Extra Burden on SD
Inequality (b = 0) (b =. 01)
CD > SD, B0  > 234.76 > L =100
CD> E,B >L= 100 >L=100
E>CD, A0  > L= 100 >L= 100
E > SD, A0  > 240.09 > L = 100
SD > CD, Go > L = 100 > 104.08
SD > E, Go > L = 100 > 103.33
The nonneutral treatment of straight debt makes the first and fourth
constraints irrelevant. The extra burden causes a very small tightening of
the fifth and sixth constraints, but the overall effect is to move the con-
straint from a lower bound of 240.09 on the high outcome to a lower
bound of 104.08, just above the "natural" lower bound of 100, the value
of the low outcome. The lesson from this example is that tax changes that
are non-neutral in that they favor one type of financing over another may
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improve a signaling equilibrium by loosening constraints on the set of
projects for which the equilibrium exists. "Good" tax policy that enforces
principles such as neutrality may impede informational efficiency.
2. Interpreting the Results
The simulations in this Part illustrate the complexity that signaling
models raise for tax policy. These models center on the costs of various
signals. For example, issuing straight debt raises the danger of low stock
prices in the future, an outcome that would be very unfortunate for risk
averse managers. This cost makes straight debt issuance a credible signal
that managers have positive private information about the firm's pros-
pects. Tax policies impose different costs on different instruments. Some
of these costs may appear to be bad tax policy, such as imposing an extra
"non-neutral" tax burden on debt, but may enhance a signaling
equilibrium.
Another aspect of complexity for tax policy is that multiple instruments
and financial policies contribute to signaling equilibria. As mentioned
previously, 10 9 the model here does not take into account many signaling
devices such as dividend policy, managerial share ownership, and debt
maturity. Nonetheless, even after simplifying this limited model further
by examining special cases, it was necessary to consider nine different
inequalities, three for the conversion game and six for the issuance game.
For a fixed low outcome, finding a range for the high outcome involves
only two of the nine constraints. It is easy to see that the fact that tax
policy has a major impact on a particular inequality may be irrelevant
since that inequality may be extraneous.
Finally, there is another important caveat. So far, the assumption be-
hind the discussion has been that a separating equilibrium is unambigu-
ously good. It is well known, however, that it is sometimes optimal to
prevent signaling even though one then has to settle for a pooling equilib-
rium. 01 0 The reason is straightforward: Signaling is costly and these costs
may outweigh the benefits that inhere in a separating equilibrium.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In its budget documents for each of the four fiscal years 1997 through
2000, the Clinton Administration's proposal to delay OID deductions on
convertible debt until the OID is paid was in a section labeled: "Elimi-
nate Unwarranted Benefits and Adopt Other Revenue Measures."11' At
first glance, it might appear that in each budget this proposal was simply
109. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
110. A seminal paper making this point in the law and economics literature is Philippe
Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Effi-
ciency, 6 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 381 (1990).
111. See President's Fiscal 1997 Budget, supra note 5, at 38-39; President's Fiscal 1998
Budget, supra note 5, at 48; President's Fiscal 1999 Budget, supra note 5, at 65; President's
Fiscal 2000 Budget, supra note 5, at 71, 81.
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
one of several fairly minor corporate tax changes that each raise a modest
amount of revenue. Perhaps the hope also was that these changes would
not be politically troubling. 1 2
This article shows that the Clinton Administration's proposal may be
much less innocuous than it may seem. The most powerful explanation
for the existence and prevalence of convertible bonds is that they are
useful in signaling firm prospects. The model that has been most success-
ful at explaining the role of these bonds in signaling, divides the signaling
process into a "conversion game" and an "issuance game." In the conver-
sion game, managers signal private information to investors through their
decision to call or not to call convertible issues. In the issuance game,
managers signal by their choice of security to fund new investment by
their firms.
The Clinton Administration's proposal may have a major impact on
both of these games. Under that proposal, the firm receives OID deduc-
tions if and only if investors never convert the bonds. This fact changes
the efficacy of calls that force conversion. Since most bonds are con-
verted, the Clinton Administration's proposal also burdens convertible
debt as an issuance device. This burden may have a major impact on the
ability to signal at the issuance stage.
Unfortunately, it is hard to tell what the direction or magnitude of the
effect of rules like the Clinton Administration's proposal would be. Sig-
naling equilibria are very complex. There are multiple ways to signal firm
prospects. Each signaling device gives rise to a number of inequalities
that determine the set of projects for which signaling is possible. Some of
the inequalities may be extraneous in the sense that they establish
borderlines that lie far away from the region carved out by the other ine-
qualities. Tax policy may have a big impact on certain inequalities, but
these inequalities may be irrelevant. It is very difficult to say which do-
main of projects and which inequalities are key with respect to converti-
ble bonds. In addition, the tax treatment of other instruments may have a
major impact on the signaling equilibria established through the use of
convertible bonds. Finally, signaling equilibria in financial markets de-
pend on the cost patterns that surround corporate decisions. As a result,
tax approaches that are defective under conventional criteria, such as the
desire to make the tax system neutral between different financing meth-
ods, may enable or enhance a signaling equilibrium because these ap-
proaches impose costs in appropriate ways.
Despite these difficulties, the heavy use of convertible bonds and the
prevalence of peculiar features of convertible bond contracts that are
112. If so, that hope was not fulfilled. A May 23, 1997 letter from eight Democratic
House Ways and Means Committee members to Chair Bill Archer opposed the provision
in the fiscal year 1998 budget delaying OID deductions along with several of the other
corporate tax revenue raisers relating to the taxation of debt. The letter states that these
provisions "go way beyond 'loophole closing,' and may, in fact have a negative effect on
capital formation and investment." Ways and Means Democrats Oppose Administration
Bond Proposals, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 105-14 (1997).
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hard to explain outside of a signaling context suggest caution. Policymak-
ers should avoid tax provisions that have substantial effects on converti-
ble debt or that turn on the conversion feature, unless there are very
important reasons for these provisions. Convertible bonds appear to play
a major role. Provisions such as the Clinton Administration's proposal
may enhance that role or destroy it. Not knowing which is the case, per-
haps the best course is to do nothing and at least preserve the role that
exists now.
Some of the results in the signaling models examined here suggest
more general concerns. Although convertible debt may be particularly
tied in with signaling, it is clear that many other instruments, including
equity and straight debt, may play an important role in signaling equilib-
ria. As a result, the signaling "side effects" of tax policy may be signifi-
cant. Unfortunately, the complexity of signaling phenomena may mean
that we do not know what the side effects are even though we suspect
that they may be important. For those who study the taxation of financial




V. APPENDIX: DEBT MATURITY SIGNALS AND TAXES
Mark Flannery has shown that debt maturity can play a signaling
role."13 His argument is as follows. Consider a two-period model where
there are three times: 0, 1, and 2. A firm finances a project by borrowing
at time 0. The payoffs are at time 2. During each time period, the firm
will draw by chance either an up or a down signal. These signals indicate
what the time 2 payoff will be. If the firm draws two down signals, the
time 2 payoff will be so low that the firm will default on its debt. There
are two types of firms. The "good" type has a much higher probability of
getting an up signal in each of the two time periods than the "bad" type.
Investors know the two firm types but do not know which firm is of which
type. Insider-managers of each firm do know their firm type.
Firms can borrow with either two-period (long-term) debt or can bor-
row for one period and then refinance for the second period. Investors
know at the end of the first period whether the firm received an up or a
down signal in that period. If a firm picks the short-term debt strategy
and the bad outcome occurs, refinancing will be very expensive because
default is more likely. On the other hand, a good signal during the first
period makes default at time 2 impossible, so the firm can refinance at
the risk-free rate.
Good firms have a much higher probability of being able to refinance
at the riskless rate under a short-term debt strategy since they are more
likely to receive an up signal during the first period. As a result, a good
firm might attempt to signal its type, and thereby reduce its borrowing
costs, by opting for short-term borrowing. However, if short-term and
long-term borrowing are equally costly, then good firms borrowing short-
term and bad firms borrowing long-term is not an equilibrium. The bad
firms will copy the good firm's signal by borrowing short-term. There will
be a pooling equilibrium in which all firms borrow short-term. This type
of result is typical: If a signal is costless, bad types will mimic good types,
and there will be a pooling equilibrium." 4
However, Flannery shows that if short-term borrowing is more expen-
sive, e.g., because the firm that borrows short-term has to borrow twice
and pay two sets of fees, then a separating equilibrium is possible. This
result suggests an immediate tax policy application. In a Flannery type of
world, tax policies that burden short-term debt more than long-term debt
might induce a separating equilibrium or extend the scope over which a
separating equilibrium is possible. The extra tax burden on short-term
borrowing would play the same role as higher issuance fees in Flannery's
article.
This article focuses on convertability rather than maturity as a signaling
device. Including maturity differences in the signaling equilibrium would
113. Flannery, supra note 83.
114. In the Nyborg-Harris-Raviv model, the cost aspect that drives the signaling is the
aversion of managers to low stock prices. Financing by debt sends a good signal, but the
cost is a much higher probability of having catastrophically low stock prices at time 3.
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be difficult. I do not attempt to do so. Nonetheless, maturity signals may
interact with the signals discussed here in the face of alternative tax ap-
proaches. This interaction is especially prominent in the choice between
discount bonds and par bonds.
Suppose that a firm wishes to borrow $1,000,000 through a ten-year
loan and that ten-year rates are 10%. If the firm borrows through zero
coupon debt it, will receive $1,000,000 today and will pay $2,593,742 in
ten years. If the firm issues par bonds instead, it will receive $1,000,000
now and will pay $100,000 in interest each year and $1,000,000 at the end
of ten years. The zero coupon debt is longer-term borrowing than the par
bond. A classic way to look at the difference is to break the par bond
down into a series of zero coupon bonds. That breakdown is as follows:
Breakdown of $1,000,000 ten year bond with 10% annual coupons
into ten zero coupon bonds.
maturity contribution
bond (years) amount due present value to duration
one year 1 $100,000 $90,909.09 .0909
two year 2 $100,000 $82,644.63 .1653
three year 3 $100,000 $75,131.48 .2254
four year 4 $100,000 $68,301.35 .2732
five year 5 $100,000 $62,092.13 .3105
six year 6 $100,000 $56,447.39 .3387
seven year 7 $100,000 $51,315.81 .3592
eight year 8 $100,000 $46,650.74 .3732
nine year 9 $100,000 $42,409.76 .3817
ten year 10 $1,100,000 $424,097.62 4.2410
total $1,000,000 6.7590
A bond's duration is the present value weighted average maturity of the
components of the bond. The computed duration for the par bond in the
table, 6.759 years, is considerably shorter than the ten-year duration for
the zero coupon bond.
In Flannery's model, the key difference between the bonds is that for
the par bond, the firm would have to finance the $100,000 annual coupon
payments. If bad information arrives, this financing would be more ex-
pensive. Thus, issuing the par bond instead of the zero is a potential way
to signal high quality.
Taxes have an interesting impact on this situation. Suppose the corpo-
rate rate is 20% and that the marginal investor is also subject to a 20%
rate. Then, for the par bond, the after-tax coupon payment drops by
$20,000 to $80,000 while the investor pays $20,000 in tax. The firm and
the investor can restore the original cash flows by raising the coupon to
$125,000. Then, the after-tax coupon for both parties will be $100,000 as
before. The same type of analysis applies to the zero coupon bonds.
OID will accrue each year creating a tax for the investor and a tax reduc-
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tion equal in amount for the corporation. In effect, adding taxes forces
the investor to lend to the corporation each year. This effect also could
be eliminated by adding coupons to the bond. These coupons would have
to increase over time since OID computed on a yield-to-maturity basis
increases over time, but the amount of OlD and the OID accrual sched-
ule would be the same as before.' 15 Thus, when the firm and the margi-
nal investor face the same marginal tax rate, taxes will not have any effect
on signaling. The firm can adjust the coupon so that, from the perspec-
tive of the market (i.e., the marginal investor), the after-tax cash flows
will be identical to those observed before imposing taxes. 116
In this happy case where the marginal investor and firms face the same
rate and maturity signaling is unaffected, there also should be little or no
effect on signaling in the convertible arena. If the parties can restore any
after-tax debt contract (in cash flow terms) to the pre-tax situation by
changing the coupon, there should be no impact on any signaling
result. I7
If firms and the marginal investor face different marginal rates, then
the situation is more complicated. If the marginal investor faces a lower
rate, then taxation creates a joint gain for the parties since the coupon or
OID deductions for the firm reduce taxes more than taxes increase for
the marginal investor due to the coupon or OlD income. If the firm cap-
tures part of this joint gain, debt financing in general will be less expen-
sive and there may be an impact on signaling equilibria. On the other
hand, the sharing of joint gain should be similar for zero coupon and par
debt,' 18 so that there should be no bias there. The analysis of the situa-
tion where the firm faces lower rates than the marginal investor is exactly
parallel. Instead of a joint gain, there is a joint loss.
The empirical evidence on the signaling impact of debt maturity is not
very clear. Several studies have found signaling effects, but the statistical
evidence is weak.11 9 Of great interest for this article is whether the
115. Computing the coupon amount is straightforward. Adding the 20% tax increases
the pre-tax market interest rate to 12.5%. One can compute annual OID assuming that the
firm borrows $1,000,000 and that OID accrues at a 12.5% rate but then replace 1/5 of the
OlD accrual with a coupon. The result will be that OlD accrues at a 10% rate, just as
before. The only difference is that the investor receives a coupon sufficient to pay the
taxes on the accruing OlD.
116. If there are inframarginal investors, they will receive a bonus. But that bonus will
accrue independent of the type of debt. Interest rates in general will have increased by
more than enough to compensate them for taxes regardless of the form the debt takes.
After-tax firm cash flows are equal to the cash flows before taxes were imposed. Thus, the
signaling properties of various kinds of debt remain the same.
117. This no impact reasoning should apply even to signaling of the Brennan/Kraus
variety where the signal is through the contract terms of the convertible. Although the
pre-tax contract terms shift in response to taxes, the after-tax terms are what matter.
Those terms are unchanged.
118. Otherwise, firms, assuming they act as agents for the shareholders, would use only
the kind of debt that maximized their share of the gain.
119. See, e.g., Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W. Smith, The Maturity Structure of Corpo-
rate Debt, 50 J. FIN. 609, 629 (1995); Karlyn Mitchell, The Debt Maturity Choice: An Empir-
ical Investigation, 16 J. FIN. RES. 309 (1993).
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choice between zero coupon debt and coupon debt matters. One study
matched zero coupon debt issues with similar issues that pay a significant
coupon.' 20 For straight debt, the abnormal returns at issuance were sta-
tistically indistinguishable. For convertible debt, issuance of zero coupon
debt had a positive statistically significant announcement effect that also
was significantly greater than the effect for coupon debt. However, most
convertible zero coupon bonds are "LYONs." LYONs have special fea-
tures, in particular, a right for holders to put the bond for cash a few years
after issuance. These features may be driving the results. The put feature
makes the effective maturity of these bonds quite short. The empirical
results may reflect a Flannery type of phenomenon where short-term
debt is associated with higher quality issuers. A second study finds high
coupon levels (versus a corporate bond benchmark) in convertible bonds
associated with more negative abnormal returns at issuance in a statisti-
cally significant way, 121 but the authors of this study do not mention ex-
cluding LYONs.
Firms may signal quality by choice of maturity for debt issues. This
article does not model maturity explicitly, but implicitly considers OID
bonds. These bonds have a longer maturity than coupon bonds with the
same nominal maturity. As a result, the choice of OID bonds may in-
volve a maturity signal. General changes in tax rates should not affect
the signaling properties of discount bonds versus par bonds. However,
the text considers tax proposals that burden discount bonds but not par
bonds. For example, the Clinton Administration's proposal eliminates
the OID deduction for convertible bonds that end up being converted, as
most do. At the same time, the holder must pay taxes on accruing OID.
Corresponding convertible par bonds do not suffer from similar effects.
If there is a signaling effect for these bonds (based on maturity), the tax
rules affect the cost structure and should affect the signaling equilibrium.
In particular, by making OlD bonds more costly, the tax rules may make
issuance of short-term or coupon bonds less effective as a signal of good
future prospects. This impact is similar to the impact in the "full game"
simulation example in the text where the Clinton Administration's propo-
sal reduces the range for effective signaling.
Unfortunately, there are further complexities. Faced with a tax that
imposes a particular burden on bonds with OlD, the issuer can respond
by increasing the conversion ratio of the bond until it is a par bond. In
effect, the straight bond component will be just as much a discount bond
as before, but the OlD will be "hidden" by the value of the conversion
right.' 22 The relative terms of the bond, however, may themselves play a
signaling role. In the Brennan/Kraus model, for example, shifting the
terms of a convertible bond away from the bond component signals lower
risk.
120. See Akhigbe et al., supra note 41, at 758-60 (empirical results).
121. See Brennan & Her, supra note 67, at,16.
122. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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In sum, there are many types of signaling, and more than one type may
come into play when considering changes in tax rules. The text ignores
the role of debt maturity in signaling and also ignores Brennan/Kraus
type signaling. Doing so makes the analysis tractable and the results un-
derstandable. However, it is clear that the text model is quite incomplete.
